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ABSTRACT 
 
Compensation theory holds that executive aggression is related to both the level and riskiness of 
“inside debt” - promises from firms to pay their executives fixed sums of cash in the future, 
including pensions and deferred compensation. However, previous researchers have only 
examined the level of inside debt. We provide an inside debt metric that is conceptually superior 
to previously used metrics, as it incorporates the riskiness of inside debt. For the entire sample, 
our metric offers modest improvement in fit over past metrics, where the dependent variable is 
future equity return volatility. Furthermore, the relation between future volatility and our risk-
adjusted inside debt metric is more prominent for non-investment grade firms, firms 
experiencing credit rating downgrades, and firms with high credit risk.  
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Risk-Adjusted Inside Debt 
 
1. Introduction 
Top executives work, in part, in exchange for promises from their firms to pay 
them fixed sums of cash in the future, including pensions and deferred compensation, 
known as “inside debt” in the language of Jensen and Meckling (1976). As first 
documented by Sundaram and Yermack (2007), managers become more conservative in 
their investment, financing, and other corporate decisions as their compensation mix tilts 
from equity-based to debt-based, which is typical as they age. Specifically, Sundaram 
and Yermack (2007) find that as a CEO’s pension value increases relative to his equity 
value, risk-taking as measured by distance-to-default declines. They note that very large 
holdings of inside debt may even lead to an overly conservative management style.5 
Subsequent studies provide additional support for a direct relation between the 
level of executive inside debt and corporate conservatism. In a widely cited study, 
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) indicate that CEO inside debt holdings are 
generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm and therefore expose the CEO to 
default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. They find a negative association 
between the level of CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock 
returns, research and development expenditures (R&D), and financial leverage, and a 
positive association between the level of CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of firm 
                                                 
5 Distance-to-default is a common metric used in fixed income analytics to assess the overall riskiness of a 
firm. Loosely speaking, it is the number of standard deviation decreases in firm value that will cause the 
firm to default on its debt. 
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diversification and asset liquidity. Other notable studies involving various aspects of 
corporate conservatism, executive compensation, and the level of inside debt include 
Edmans and Liu (2011), Wei and Yermack (2011), Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 
(2013), Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White (2013), Kabir, Li, and Yulia (2013), Liu, Mauer, 
and Zhang (2014), Chi, Huang, and Sanchez (2014), Abhishek, Armitage, and 
Hagendorff (2014), Choy, Lin, and Officer (2014), and Kubick, Lockhart, and Robinson 
(2014), among many others.6 
The aforementioned studies hypothesize and test that corporate conservatism 
(aggression) increases (decreases) as the level of inside debt rises. However, this is not 
precisely what executive compensation theory states. The theory also holds that 
conservatism (aggression) increases (decreases) as the riskiness of inside debt rises. For 
example, if a CEO has high absolute inside debt, he nevertheless may be aggressive if 
the expected probability of default (expected recovery rate) of his inside debt is zero 
(100 percent). For another example, if a CEO has low inside debt, he may nevertheless 
be relatively conservative if the expected probability of default (expected recovery rate) 
of his inside debt is high (low). Previous studies fail to account for the risk element of 
inside debt theory, and their empirical hypothesis of a direct relation between 
conservatism and the level of inside debt is somewhat incomplete. A more properly 
stated hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling’s theory of inside debt incentives would be 
that there exists a direct relation between conservatism and the credit risk-adjusted level 
                                                 
6  There is also a large body of literature regarding corporate conservatism and managerial equity 
incentives, cf. Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2006). 
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of inside debt.7 Given the sophistication and resources of CEOs, it is reasonable to 
assume that they understand the difference – in terms of their incentives – between the 
level of their inside debt and the credit risk-adjusted level of their inside debt. Previous 
researchers have pooled risky and less-risky inside debt, resulting in outcomes that are 
somewhat difficult to interpret economically. The compensation policies based on the 
outcomes may become suboptimal. By not differentiating between the qualities of inside 
debt, past researchers have not fully explored the empirical relation between 
conservatism and inside debt.8 
Our examination of the credit risk of inside debt reveals that there can be 
important differences between raw and credit risk-adjusted inside debt levels, especially 
for very credit risky firms. Supposing that two CEOs have the same level of inside debt, 
the CEO in the more credit risky firm will be more conservative. This leads us to 
hypothesize that the relation between CEO conservatism and CEO inside debt may be 
stronger once the credit risk of inside debt is accommodated, particularly for high-risk 
                                                 
7 The level of inside debt per se is merely its promised value. The credit risk-adjusted level of inside debt 
is its expected value, i.e., the promised value less anticipated loss due to the firm’s failure to pay. Theory 
holds that the executive will make decisions based on the expected value of his inside debt holding, and 
not its promised value. 
8 For example, the popular measure of inside debt, “k”, constructed in Cassell et al. (2012) and other 
studies, does not adjust for the expected probability of inside debt default or the expected recovery rate on 
inside debt in the event of default. The metric k is a special case/nested version of our metric; k is obtained 
from our metric (called k*) after setting the expected default probability on inside debt equal to zero or the 
expected recovery rate (in the event of default) equal to 100 percent. Put another way, the popular k metric 
uses the promised value of inside debt, while our adjusted k metric uses the expected value of inside debt. 
See sections 2 and 3.1 below. There is a sort of irony to using the promised value of inside debt (in prior 
studies); while researchers recognize that the theory states that executives holding inside debt are 
concerned about its credit risk, by using promised value the researchers nevertheless implicitly treat the 
inside debt as if it were default risk-free. 
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firms. For instance, in our data, Cardinal Health Care (R. Kerry Clark, CEO) had in 2009 
a higher raw-k metric, which is the popular measure of inside debt level first constructed 
in Cassell et al. (2012), than Corning (Wendell Weeks, CEO).  According to previous 
empirical studies, this would imply that the CEO of Cardinal (Corning) should be 
relatively less (more) aggressive. However, for the same year the credit risk-adjusted k 
metric of Cardinal was lower than that of Corning, implying that the CEO of Cardinal 
(Corning) should, according to the theory, be in fact relatively more (less) aggressive. 
The likely reason for this ordinal change in predicted aggression is reflected in the firms’ 
differential credit risk. As indicated by their 2009 credit ratings, Cardinal’s debt was 
investment grade while Corning’s was non-investment grade (junk), indicating that 
Corning’s CEO should be more concerned about the prospect of not collecting his inside 
debt than Cardinal’s CEO.9,10 
Our study makes three contributions to the literature relating to executive 
aggression and inside debt. First, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
provide a metric that reflects a credit risk-adjusted level of inside debt, and is therefore 
conceptually superior to previously used metrics. Second, we demonstrate empirically 
that our metric is a more powerful determinant of corporate conservatism, as captured by 
future firm stock return volatility, relative to raw-k. While the improvement in fit offered 
                                                 
9In Cassell et al.’s k metric, a lower level of k implies that the CEO should be more aggressive. With our 
risk-adjusted k metric, a lower level of k* also implies that the CEO should be more aggressive. 
10 In general, the difference between k and k* widens as the credit quality of the firm diminishes, because 
the likelihood that the CEO collects the promised value of his inside debt falls. Empirical results confirm 
this difference; see section 4.1 and Figure 1 below.  
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by our metric is modest for the overall sample, it is more pronounced for non-investment 
grade firms, firms experiencing credit downgrades, and firms with high credit risk. 
Third, in a related test designed to control for endogeneity, we show that the relation 
between inside debt and executive conservatism heightens during the 2007-08 credit 
crisis. 
When conducting our tests, we first replicate those conducted by Cassell et al. 
(2012) where return volatility is the dependent variable.11 We use their k metric and find 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results to those reported by Cassell et al. (2012). 
We then repeat the tests while substituting our adjusted k metric. We detail the 
construction of our metric in Section 3.1.12 Our metric accounts for both the expected 
cumulative default probability and expected recovery rate of inside debt (unsecured, with 
appropriate maturity), initially using data provided by Moody’s Investor Services. Thus, 
our paper represents a blending of the literatures on executive compensation and credit 
risk measurement. For the overall sample of firms, the coefficient of our k* metric is 
greater (in absolute value) and has a larger t-value than those, respectively, of the 
coefficient of the raw-k metric in Cassell et al. (2012).13 Therefore, our results indicate 
                                                 
11 We choose future stock return volatility as the managerial choice variable because it is a broad measure 
of risk, highly correlated with credit spreads, and therefore closely related to distance-to-default. 
12 We use the expected value of the inside debt by incorporating the expected default probability and the 
expected recovery rate of executives’ inside debt in the event of default, rather than its promised raw 
value. The executives should be concerned about the expected value of their inside debt instead of the raw 
value, per the (correct) theory on inside debt. An analogy is the valuation of executive options with 
probability (or riskiness) included (i.e., N() in the Black-Scholes model). 
13 Note that the raw-k metric of Cassell et al. is already significant at the 1% critical level. It is difficult to 
improve at such a high level (at least in empirical finance). Therefore the fact that k* shows any 
improvement over raw-k is rather remarkable, statistically speaking. We return to this matter in Section 4. 
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that the relation between CEO conservatism and the level of CEO risk-adjusted inside 
debt is stronger than the relation between CEO conservatism and the level of CEO raw 
inside debt. Moreover, the improvement in fit offered by our metric is more pronounced 
for non-investment grade firms, firms that have experienced a ratings downgrade, and 
firms with high credit risk.14 That is, the gap between the significance of k* and that of k 
seems to widen both economically and statistically for these risky firms. 
When repeating the tests of Cassell et al. (2012), we are careful to use similar 
methods including the choice of documented control variables and, for two-stage tests 
designed to address endogeneity, the choice of instrument variables. For firms with little 
debt, our metric k* – like the unadjusted k metric – can be artificially high, suggesting 
that the executive should be quite conservative. 15  Following Cassell et al. (2012, 
footnote 19, page 596), we keep sample firms with raw-k values greater than or equal to 
10, though eliminating these firms does not impact our results.16 Also, we investigate the 
                                                 
14 One may initially wonder why we adjust the executive’s inside debt for credit risk but do not adjust the 
firm’s (outside) debt for credit risk. The reason is obvious, however; from the executive’s perspective, the 
inside debt is an asset and therefore subject to default risk, while from the firm’s perspective both the 
inside and outside debt are liabilities. Also, like those cited previously, our study fails to control for the 
possibility that CEOs are hedging their inside debt risk, presumably via derivative securities, which would 
have the effect of bifurcating executive compensation design and executive risk taking. However, if CEOs 
are hedging their credit risk exposure to their firms, such hedging would only serve to bias results toward a 
finding of no relation between risk-adjusted inside debt and corporate conservatism. 
15 To understand this result, note that the raw-k metric is given by [VED/VEE]/[VFD/VFE], where VED is 
the promised value (i.e., level) of the executive’s inside debt, VEE is his equity value, VFD is the (book) 
value of the firm’s (outside) debt, and VFE is the equity value of the firm. For low debt firms (low VFD) k 
can be very large. Note that the raw-k metric is a measure of relative CEO leverage, i.e., raw-k is the ratio 
of CEO debt-to-equity to firm debt-to-equity. 
16 Another reason why raw-k values can be unusually high is that firms may be relying less on equity 
instruments to compensate their CEOs, i.e., VEE is unusually low.   
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prospect that a change in CEO could be driving the results, but find that results remain 
intact after controlling for this possibility.  
Another concern in our empirical setting is that stock volatility and credit risk 
(captured by our adjusted k) should be highly positively correlated (Merton, 1974), as 
both are determined by firm fundamental risk. However, this endogeneity problem 
actually works against us finding the documented negative relation between our inside 
debt measure and future stock volatility. Furthermore, we use a powerful natural 
experiment to address endogeneity. We find that, during the credit crisis of 2007 and 
2008, the relation between CEO conservatism (aggression) and both raw-k and our 
measure of risk-adjusted inside debt (k*) heightens (wanes) when compared to the 
relation during the non-credit crisis period. The examination of the credit crisis period 
presents a unique experiment that addresses endogeneity concerns because, absent some 
other cogent reasons for CEOs to become more conservative, the finding indicates that 
corporate planning is sensitive to a CEO’s personal credit risk exposure. Like more 
traditional creditors, CEOs appear to reduce risk when general credit conditions 
deteriorate. 
Finally, for robustness we use alternative methods of adjusting inside debt levels 
for the credit riskiness of the debt. We use ratings data from two major rating agencies. 
In addition, we use expected default probabilities and expected recovery rates implied 
from credit default swaps for a small subsample of firms. Regardless of which rating 
agency we use, or if we use credit default swap spreads, we find that the relation 
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between future firm equity return volatility and our credit risk-adjusted k metric is 
stronger than the relation for raw-k.17 
Section 2 provides our motivation and hypothesis development. Section 3 
explains our main research design. Section 4 discusses the sample selection process and 
major empirical results. Section 5 presents the credit crisis test, the new CEO test, and 
other robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
Executive compensation contracts are structured to align the interests of 
managers with those of owners (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Bebchuk and Jolls, 1999). While the literature on the incentive effects of compensation 
packages mainly focuses on equity-based compensation (Murphy, 1985; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987; Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Coles et al., 2006), a newer and 
growing body of studies has focused on debt-based compensation in light of the 
recognition that inside debt may be prevalent and substantial. Over 80% of CEOs hold 
some form of inside debt which on average amounts to $10 million (Wei and Yermack, 
2011). Consistent with such large holdings, the literature demonstrates directly or 
indirectly that executives with greater levels of inside debt protect the value of their 
                                                 
17 Given the efficiency of the credit markets, and the rarity of “split ratings”, it is not surprising that results 
are similar when adjusting inside debt using different ratings firms as well as credit default swap spreads.  
We find that the values of the product [DP x (1 – RR)] obtained from different rating agencies, as well as 
from swap spreads, are all highly correlated. A split rating occurs when two different rating agencies 
provide different credit ratings to the same firm/instrument. 
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holdings by practicing more conservatism. For example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) 
show that CEO inside debt is positively related to distance to default. Also, inside debt 
has been linked to both the cost of debt and the use of debt covenants (Anantharaman, 
Fang, and Gong, 2013; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2010), as well as accounting conservatism 
(Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010). In addition, Cassell et al. (2012) demonstrate that CEOs 
with large inside debt protect their holdings by implementing less risky investment and 
financial policies. 
The promised value of inside debt represents its default-free value. According to 
theory, however, the value of CEO inside debt holdings is sensitive to both the 
probability of bankruptcy and the liquidation value of the firm in the event of bankruptcy 
or reorganization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, by pooling risky and less-risky 
inside debt without differentiating between the qualities of inside debt, past empirical 
researchers have not fully explored the empirical relation between executive 
conservatism and inside debt, especially for high-risk firms. By accommodating the 
credit risk of inside debt, this study provides, for the first time, an inside debt metric that 
is conceptually superior to previously used metrics. 
More specifically, the popular measure of inside debt (k) constructed in the 
current literature (e.g., Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012; Anantharaman, 
Fang, and Gong, 2013) does not adjust for the expected probability of inside debt default 
or the expected recovery rate on inside debt in the event of default. The metric k is a 
nested version of our metric; k is obtained from our metric, k*, after setting the expected 
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default probability on inside debt equal to zero or the expected recovery rate (in the 
event of default) equal to 100 percent. In other words, the popular k metric uses the 
promised value of the inside debt payoff, while our adjusted k metric uses its expected 
value.  
We build on the theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Edmans and Liu (2011), who posit that inside debt holdings are likely to elicit increased 
conservatism. More specifically, we predict that there is lower future firm equity return 
volatility associated with more credit risk-adjusted inside debt. This relation should be 
more prominent than was previously found based on the traditionally used raw-k metric. 
Thus our main hypothesis is: 
 
H1: There is a more powerful negative association between CEO credit risk-adjusted 
inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns than the previously 
documented relation between CEO raw inside debt holdings and the volatility of 
future firm stock returns. Furthermore, this more powerful negative association is 
especially apparent for very credit risky firms. 
 
 To test this hypothesis, we first investigate all sample firms using k and k*, and 
find that k* exhibits a slightly better fit to the data. We further focus on more credit risky 
firms, and find that the improvement in fit is enhanced for subsamples consisting of non-
investment grade firms, firms that experienced a ratings downgrade, and credit risky 
firms. 
 
3. Main Research Design 
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In this section, we provide a broad overview of our testing methods, first starting 
with an introduction of our credit risk-adjusted metric k* and the intuition behind its 
various inputs. Please see Appendix A for details regarding the calculation of k*, which 
is our main independent variable. We further discuss our regression models as well as 
the measurement of our main dependent variables in this section.  
 
3.1. CREDIT RISK-ADJUSTED METRIC 
Our metric, k*, which accommodates the credit riskiness of inside debt, is given 
by: 
k* = {[(VED – (VED)(DP)(1 – RR))/VEE]/[VFD/VFE]}   (1) 
where VED is the promised value (i.e., level) of the executive’s inside debt; DP is the 
expected cumulative default probability on the inside debt; RR is the expected recovery 
rate on the inside debt in the event of its default; VEE is the executive’s equity value; 
VFD is the book value of the firm’s outside debt; and VFE is the equity value of the 
firm. From the executive’s perspective, inside debt is one element of the firm’s 
unsecured outside debt. Thus, DP is best represented by the expected cumulative 
probability of default of the firm’s unsecured outside debt, with appropriate maturity.  
Note that the raw-k metric is given by [VED/VEE]/[VFD/VFE], without 
considering DP and RR. To obtain k*, we substitute the expression {VED - 
[(VED)(DP)(1 – RR)]} for VED in the original k. Thus we use the expected value of the 
inside debt (the term in braces), rather than its promised value (merely VED). The term 
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[(VED)(DP)(1 - RR)] is, of course, the executive’s expected loss on his inside debt. With 
a greater DP or lower RR, the expected loss is greater, the expected value of inside debt 
is lower, the k* is lower, and therefore the executive will be more conservative, per the 
(correct) theory on inside debt. 
There are several features of k*. First, for low-debt firms (low VFD), k* (like k) 
can be very large. Second, for firms that compensate their executives with little equity 
(low VEE), k* (like k) can be very large. Like Cassell et al. (2012) we do not restrict k*, 
and the elimination of firms with k* greater than 10 does not affect our results. Third, 
like k, k* is a measure of relative CEO leverage, i.e., k* is a ratio of CEO debt-to-equity 
to firm debt-to-equity. As such, a lower value of k* suggests greater CEO aggression, 
and thus more future firm stock return volatility. Fourth, whereas VED is the promised 
value of the executive’s inside debt, the product (VED – (VED)(DP)(1 – RR)) is the 
expected value of the inside debt. Fifth and foremost, k is obtained from k* by either 
setting DP equal to 0 (no default) or RR equal to 1 (full recovery in the event of a 
default). In other words, k is a nested version of k*, the former obtained by erroneously 
assuming that inside debt is default-free. 
When computing k* we use the exact same procedures as Cassell et al. (2012) to 
obtain VED, VEE, VFD, and VFE. As such, we obtain similar raw-k metrics to those 
reported by Cassell et al. (2012). As described in detail in section 4.1., to obtain DP and 
RR we initially use ratings data and their corresponding historical default probabilities 
and recovery rates provided by Moody’s Investor Services. We use data corresponding 
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to the firm’s unsecured outside debt whose maturity most closely matches the expected 
maturity of the CEO’s inside debt: the latter is defined as the difference between 
retirement age and current CEO age. For robustness, we also use ratings data provided 
by Standard & Poor’s, as well as credit default spread data, the latter of which is 
available for a subsample of firms. 
 
3.2. MODELING FUTURE FIRM STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY AND k* 
Cassell et al. (2012) document a negative association between CEO inside debt 
holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns. The starting point of our 
investigation is to replicate their main finding and then introduce our measure k*. We 
model the relationship between firm stock volatility and CEO inside debt holdings while 
closely following Cassell et al. (2012), using the following regression specifications: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +∑𝛽0 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝑛+1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽𝑛+2 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀   (𝑂𝐿𝑆)                                                                            (2) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
= 𝛼0 +∑𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗
𝑘+𝑛
𝑗=𝑘+1
+ 𝛽𝑘+𝑛+1
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽𝑘+𝑛+2 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀   (2𝑆𝐿𝑆)                                                                       (3) 
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Where: 
Volatility of future firm stock returns is one of two variables: Log of total risk or Log 
of idiosyncratic risk. Each of these is measured over two windows: t+1 and t+1 to 
t+3 (see section 3.2.1.1); 
 
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is one of two variables: Log of CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio or k, Log of adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio or k* (see 
section 3.2.1.2.); 
Controls is a vector of control variables (see Appendix B); 
Instruments  is a vector of instrumental variables (see section 4.3.); 
Industry fixed effects is a vector of dummy variables for each two-digit SIC code 
represented in the sample; and 
 
Year fixed effects is a vector of dummy variables for each year represented in the 
sample. 
 
First we conduct an OLS analysis using equation (2). We then proceed to a 2SLS 
analysis in which we first regress k and k* on our instruments using equation (3), and 
then use the predicted values from the first-stage regression results as explanatory 
variables in equation (2) as the second stage. 
 
3.2.1. Variable Measurement 
3.2.1.1. Measurement of volatility of future firm stock returns  
Following the prior literature (Cassell et al., 2012; Xu and Malkiel, 2003), we 
adopt two measures of volatility of future firm performance. The first is total risk as 
measured by the variance of daily firm stock returns in fiscal year t+1 (Cassell et al., 
2012; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). The second is idiosyncratic risk estimated as 
 
16 
 
the variance of daily residual returns in fiscal year t+1. We use daily firm returns data 36 
months prior to the beginning of fiscal year t+1 to estimate the market model (Xu and 
Malkiel, 2003). We construct expected daily stock returns in fiscal year t+1. By 
subtracting the expected daily returns from the realized returns, we obtain the daily 
residual returns. Idiosyncratic risk is then estimated as the variance of daily residual 
returns in fiscal year t+1. We take the natural logarithm of both measures to mitigate the 
concern that skewness in the distribution of these measures may affect our inferences 
(Core and Guay, 1999; Goyal and Santa Clara, 2003; Xu and Malkiel, 2003). To mitigate 
concerns that our time window is not long enough to capture the implications of firm 
policy choices on the volatility of future firm performance, as in Cassell et al. (2012), we 
also construct total risk and idiosyncratic risk over the window t+1 through t+3 as 
alternative measures. After requiring that firms have complete data to obtain the 
volatility of future firm stock returns from t+1 through t+3, our initial sample size is 
3,899 firm-year observations covering fiscal years 2006 to 2010.18 
 
3.2.1.2. Measurement of CEO inside debt holdings  
The literature to date has measured CEO inside debt holdings as k or the CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio (Cassell et al., 2012; 
Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Formulaically,  
𝑘 = (
𝑉𝐸𝐷
𝑉𝐸𝐸
) (
𝑉𝐹𝐷
𝑉𝐹𝐸
)⁄                   (4) 
                                                 
18 As discussed momentarily, subsequent data requirements will further reduce our final testing sample to 
1,984 firm year observations. 
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We offer an improved measure of inside debt that is grounded in modern credit 
risk measurement. We adjust the original k measure to arrive at our k* metric - the 
adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. In particular, we adjust the "raw" inside debt for 
the firm's probability of default and the executive's expected recovery rate. We assume 
that the amount of inside debt owed to the CEO is VED. Denoting the expected default 
probability and the expected recovery rate of executives’ inside debt as DP and RR 
respectively for the appropriate maturity, the expected loss (EL, i.e., the "true" credit 
risk) to the CEO is: EL=VED*DP*(1-RR). 
Our inside debt measure adjusted by creditability is defined as: 
𝑘∗ = (
𝑉𝐸𝐷 − 𝐸𝐿
𝑉𝐸𝐸
) (
𝑉𝐹𝐷
𝑉𝐹𝐸
)⁄                              (5) 
Therefore,  
𝑘∗ = (
𝑉𝐸𝐷 − 𝐸𝐿
𝑉𝐸𝐸
) (
𝑉𝐹𝐷
𝑉𝐹𝐸
)⁄ = [
𝑉𝐸𝐷 − 𝑉𝐸𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑅)
𝑉𝐸𝐸
] (
𝑉𝐹𝐷
𝑉𝐹𝐸
)⁄
= [1 − 𝐷𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑅)] ∗ (
𝑉𝐸𝐷
𝑉𝐸𝐸
) (
𝑉𝐹𝐷
𝑉𝐹𝐸
)⁄  
Comparing our k* to the original k in the literature (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012), it is 
apparent that the raw-k measure is a special case of k*: 
𝑘∗ = [1 − 𝐷𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑅)] ∗ 𝑘
𝐷𝑃=0,𝑅𝑅=1
⇒        𝑘∗ = 𝑘          (6) 
Aside from inside debt holdings, VED, there are three additional inputs in 
equation (5): DP and RR of inside debt, and the Maturity of DP and RR. Because these 
inputs are not directly observable, we need proxies to conduct our empirical tests. Our 
proxy for Maturity is the adjusted CEO’s expected decision horizon with the firm. As for 
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the CEO decision horizon (DH), we follow Antia, Pantzalis, and Park (2010) to further 
adjust the CEO’s expected DH for industry median age and industry median tenure. We 
believe this is the most appropriate maturity that balances the CEO’s expected decision 
horizon and the data limitation imposed by the firm’s bond issuances.19 To estimate DP 
and RR, we use Moody’s updated statistics on the cumulative global default rates both 
by letter rating and by alphanumeric rating since 1920 in their annual default study. 
Refer to Appendix A for details of the calculation of our adjusted inside debt measure. 
To calculate k*, there must be at least one bond whose maturity can capture the CEO’s 
expected decision horizon, so that we are able to obtain the firm’s rating, cumulative 
default rate, and expected recovery rate. However, for some firms no such bond exists. 
For these cases, we estimate a company’s debt rating, cumulative default rate, and 
expected recovery rate based upon comparable companies.20   
 
4. Data and Discussion of Major Empirical Results 
In this section, we provide details on how our sample was selected, and discuss 
basic summary statistics for variables found in this study. We illustrate that our main 
                                                 
19 In practice it is not always possible to identify a corporate bond whose time-to-maturity exactly captures 
the maturity of the CEO’s inside debt. Moreover, the cumulative default rates and expected recovery rates 
reported by Moody’s only cover years 1 through 20. The term “most appropriate maturity” is defined as 
the most reasonable proxy for the maturity of CEO’s inside debt on the basis of balancing the extant firm’s 
bonds, the CEO’s expected decision horizon and the period coverage of Moody’s report on default rates 
and recovery rates. See Appendix A for details of this proxy derivation. 
20 Following Sundaram and Yermack (2007), for firms without a bond rating, we estimate a company’s 
debt rating based on comparable companies. We select comparable companies for a firm based on two-
digit SIC code and firm size, and use the average rating of its comparable companies as the proxy. 
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independent variable k* can differ substantially from k when credit conditions 
deteriorate. We show results for OLS and 2SLS regressions, and split our sample based 
on different measures of credit risk. 
 
4.1. SAMPLE SELECTION PROCESS 
We attempt to cover all observations reported under the FAS 123R issued by the 
FASB in 2004 (OLD_DATAFMT_FLAG=0) during fiscal years 2006 to 2014. Prior to 
2006, reporting rules did not require firms to disclose their CEOs’ inside debt positions. 
Because our data was pulled as of August 2014 and we have few observations for fiscal 
2014 in Execucomp, we narrow the range to fiscal 2006 to 2013. Since the Merged 
CRSP/Compustat Database ends in fiscal 2012, we convert the permnos through cusips 
into GVKEY for the daily 2013 prices to merge CRSP and Compustat for fiscal 2013 
and use the extant data in Merged CRSP/Compustat for fiscal years 2006-2012. As 
mentioned in the last section, our measurements of the volatility of future firm stock 
returns are variances of daily firm stock returns in year t+1 through t+3. Our final sample 
covers all observations from fiscal 2006 to 2010 with complete data on compensation in 
Execucomp to compute inside debt measures, as well as on stock prices/financial 
statements in CRSP/Compustat to estimate the dependent variables and all the control 
variables. The above requirements leave us with 1,984 firm-year observations.  
Panel A of Table 1 displays the summary statistics of k and k*, including key 
components of CEO compensation that are used as inputs to calculate k and k*. The 
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table also contains our dependent variables and additional regression control variables 
for fiscal years 2006-2010. Note that k and k* have high standard deviations and that 
there are some unusually high k and k* values in the sample. This finding is not 
surprising because, per Cassell et al. (2012), some firms have unusually small debt-to-
equity ratios and rely less on equity instruments to compensate their CEOs, resulting in 
higher CEO-specific debt-to-equity ratios.  
[Insert Table 1] 
In Figure 1, we show that the spread between k and k* widens as we move from 
Aaa down to Ccc. We also illustrate that the mean values of k and k* begin to increase 
after the 2008 credit crisis, which may indicate that inside debt holdings are becoming a 
more important component of CEO compensation.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
4.2. RESULTS FOR OLS ESTIMATION 
We replicate the main tests conducted by Cassell et al. (2012) where the 
independent variable is the original raw-k metric. We are careful to use similar methods, 
including the choice of documented control variables. In Table 2 we see results that are 
very similar to those of Cassell et al. (2012) for our sample from 2006-2010. Note that 
our sample period is longer than Cassell et al.’s, and this is likely the reason that our 
results vary slightly. In Panel A, we have the log of idiosyncratic risk (Columns 1-4) and 
the log of total risk for t+1 (Columns 5-8) as dependent variables, and in Panel B we 
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have the log of idiosyncratic risk (Columns 1-4) and log of total risk for t+3 (Columns 5-
8) as dependent variables. The four explanatory variables 21  are of largely negative 
significance in explaining the dependent variables, showing that CEOs with more inside 
debt implement more conservative corporate policies. 
[Insert Table 2] 
We next repeat the same analysis and instead use k* as the main explanatory 
variable. Recall that the calculation of k* requires several additional inputs, the overall 
effect of which is to reduce the sample size to 1,984 firm-year observations. In Table 3 
we compare k and k* side by side, based on the same sample, and in each case the k* 
measure has a larger coefficient (in absolute value) and a larger t-stat than the original 
k.22 For example, in Columns (1-2) the coefficient on k* is -0.0467 with t-stat of -3.74, 
which are both larger than k’s coefficient of -0.0460 and its t-stat of -3.68. This pattern 
of k*’s superior ability to predict the dependent variables can be seen throughout Table 
3. 
[Insert Table 3] 
While it appears at first glance that the improved fit offered by k* over k is 
nominal for the overall sample, the reader should keep in mind that the coefficient on k 
is already significant at the 1% critical level. In general, it is, empirically speaking, 
                                                 
21 21 For detailed definitions of the four k measures, please refer to Cassell et al. (2011). For simplicity, we 
use, throughout the paper, the k measure, the most used measure in Cassell et al. (2011). However the 
other three alternative measures generate similar results for all our tests. 
22 For firms with little debt, the k or k* metrics can be artificially high, suggesting that the executive 
should be quite conservative. However, consistent with Cassell et al. (2012, footnote 19, page 596), we 
obtain similar results if we eliminate sample firms with raw-k values greater than or equal to 10. 
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difficult to improve upon an explanatory variable that is significant at such a high level. 
The fact that k* offers any improvement in fit is an empirical testament to its prowess. 
The obvious conceptual superiority of k* is, in general, supported empirically by the 
results in Table 3. Overall, the results presented in Table 3 support our main hypothesis, 
H1. 
 
4.3. A “HORSE RACE”  
In order to directly compare the explanatory power of k and k*, we conduct a 
“horse race” by putting both measures in the same regressions. In Table 4 Panel A, the 
OLS results show that the coefficients of k become positive and insignificant, while the 
coefficients of k* remain negative, which is consistent with the theory, but insignificant. 
The extremely high VIF (Variance inflation factors) of k and k*, much higher than the 
rule-of-thumb value 10 (Belsley, 1991), indicates that the co-existence of k and k* leads 
to the multicollinearity problem, which increases the variance of the estimators and 
makes the estimated parameters unstable and insignificant (Kutner et al., 2004). 
To address the multicollinearity problem, we follow Hoerl and Kennard (1970a, 
b) and Vinod (1978) by using ridge regression. Specifically, we estimate parameters via 
a “shrinkage” method that incorporates a small amount of bias into the estimating 
equation, thereby substantially reducing the sampling variance of the estimators in the 
presence of correlated data. See Appendix C for detailed discussion of ridge regression. 
The results in Table 4 Panel B show that k* outperforms k consistently, both in statistical 
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significance and economical significance. In particular, when included in the same 
regressions, k becomes insignificant while k* remains highly significant. Our risk-
adjusted measure of inside debt seems, therefore, more relevant in determining firm risk.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.4. RESULTS FOR TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
We alternatively use two-stage tests designed to address endogeneity and utilize 
the same (except for one) choice of instrument variables as Cassell et al. (2012). We 
apply 2SLS in Table 5, repeating the same analysis as in Table 3. We use nearly 
identical instrumental variables (IV’s) as those used by Cassell et al. (2012), namely 
CEO age, new CEO flag, natural logarithm of total assets and firm age, liquidity 
constraint flag, favorable tax status, maximum state tax rate on individual income, and 
industry median inside debt measures. We only exclude CEO age as an IV because it is 
used in the computation of k*, thus creating a mechanical relation between CEO age and 
our adjusted inside debt measure. In our 2SLS analysis, we first regress k and k* on our 
instruments using equation (3), and then use the predicted values from the first-stage 
regression results as explanatory variables in equation (2).  
 In Columns 1-2 of Table 5, we see that k* has a coefficient of -0.1694 with a t-
stat of -4.29, whereas k has a smaller coefficient of -0.1654 and a t-stat of -4.15 in 
explaining the log of total risk in year t+1. This pattern of k*’s superiority can be 
observed in Columns 3-4 as well. Consistent with the results presented in Table 3, the 
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conceptual superiority of k* is, in general, supported empirically by the results in Table 
5. Overall, the results presented in Table 5 support our main hypothesis, H1. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
4.5. RESULTS FOR INVESTMENT VS. NON-INVESTMENT GRADE FIRMS 
As hypothesized earlier, we expect k* to exhibit a better fit for more credit risky 
firms where DP and RR discount the raw-k to greater degree. To investigate this aspect 
of our hypothesis, we examine k* for three subsamples: firms that are non-investment 
grade (this section); firms that experience credit downgrades (section 4.6); and firms 
with high credit risk (section 4.7). In all three cases we report results from OLS analysis. 
We also obtain similar qualitative results for 2SLS analysis. 
By separating our sample into investment and non-investment grades, we find, as 
hypothesized, that k* performs better for the latter cohort. The difference for our sample 
split according to Moody’s credit ratings can be seen by contrasting the coefficients and 
t-stats in Columns 1-2 with those in Columns 3-4 of Table 6. Specifically, for the non-
investment grade group (below Baa3), k* has a coefficient of -0.0477, larger (in absolute 
terms) than that of k at -0.0460. However, the coefficient for k* is not larger than the 
coefficient for k for the investment grade group (Baa3 or better). While the results 
reported in Table 6 are limited to the log of total risk at time t + 1, similar results are 
obtained for the other dependent variables. Overall, Table 6, when compared with Table 
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3, shows that the gap between the significance of k* and k widens both economically 
and statistically for non-investment grade firms.23 This is consistent with our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
4.6. RESULTS FOR FIRMS EXPERIENCING CREDIT DOWNGRADES 
 We hypothesize that k* should outperform k even further for firms experiencing 
credit downgrades. To correctly identify these firms, we require firms to have at least 
two back-to-back annual credit rating observations. The subsample of firms with such 
observations is 1,092 (out of our 1,984 firms). Of these 1,092 firms, 410 experienced a 
credit rating downgrade (of one or more “notches”). Table 7 reports OLS analysis for 
these 410 cases. In general, the results reported are consistent with the notion that k* 
outperforms k for these firms, albeit results for the t+3 variables are statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, when comparing the coefficients on k* in Table 7 with those in 
Table 3, we see that the former are much larger (in absolute value), despite the smaller 
size of the downgrade subsample. Furthermore, when compared with Table 3, the 
improvement of k* over k appears more prominent, economically and statistically, in the 
results for t+1 (but not for t+3 since they are all insignificant). These results are 
generally consistent with H1 and further suggest that k* is a superior measure for credit 
risky firms. 
                                                 
23 We also investigated sample splits by above or equal to Ba3 versus below Ba3, and by above Caa1 
versus equal to or below Caa1. Firms are classified as having “distressed debt” if their rating is Caa1 or 
worse. While the results of our investigation were generally consistent with the hypothesis that k* 
outperforms k for the riskier cohorts, small sample sizes precluded us from making any strong inferences. 
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[Insert Table 7] 
 
4.7. RESULTS FOR CREDIT RISKY FIRMS 
 As with non-investment grade firms and firms that experienced credit rating 
downgrades, we also expect k* to exhibit improved empirical fit for firms with higher-
than-median [1-DP(1-RR)]. After all, [1-DP(1-RR)] is our unique “credit risk adjustment 
factor,” driving the difference between the promised payoffs and the expected payoffs of 
the inside debt. Table 8 Panel A suggests that for less risky firms, k and k* perform 
similarly. Note that if [1-DP(1-RR)]=1, k and k* are identical. In addition, if the firm is 
safe, the inside debt does not affect the managerial decision. Therefore, the results are 
less significant than those in Table 3. 
 We find interesting results in Panel B for credit risky firms. These are much 
more significant than those in Panel A and in Table 3, suggesting that inside debt does 
affect the executives’ decision in credit risky firms. More importantly, k* outperforms k 
even more in this subsample. This illustrates that the riskiness of inside debt is an 
important consideration, especially for credit risky firms. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
5. Credit Crisis and Robustness Tests 
In this section we conduct robustness checks to further test the relationship 
between k* and firm risk using OLS and 2SLS, and we discuss the results. We also 
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outline other robustness checks involving the derivation of DP and RR from credit 
default swap spreads. 
 
5.1. CREDIT CRISIS TEST 
Assuming that the current credit crisis was an unanticipated exogenous shock to 
most individual firms, we use it as a natural experiment to address endogeneity (e.g., 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), and investigate 
whether the relation between executive conservatism (aggression) and credit risk-
adjusted inside debt strengthens (wanes) during the crisis. We separate our sample into 
two sub-periods: the crisis period (2007 and 2008), and the non-crisis period (2006, 2009 
and 2010). We then conduct 2SLS. The instruments used include new CEO flag, natural 
logarithm of total assets and firm age, liquidity constraint flag, favorable tax status, 
maximum state tax rate on individual income, and industry median inside debt measures. 
In Table 9, we first regress k and k* on our instruments, and then use the predicted 
values from the first-stage regression results as explanatory variables. Results are largely 
consistent with the inference that executives become more conservative during a credit 
crisis. For example, the t-statistics on the k* variables are generally greater during the 
crisis period, especially when the dependent variable is total risk. Also, results indicate 
that k* is still more robust than its original k as an explanatory variable throughout Table 
9. 
[Insert Table 9] 
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5.2. RESULTS OF ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
As noted earlier, we also obtain DP and RR – for the full sample (1,984 firm- 
years) – by using alternative ratings data and their associated historical default 
probabilities and recovery rates provided by Standard and Poor’s. Furthermore, for a 
subsample of firms (318 firm years) we were able to impute DP and RR from 5-year 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads as provided by Bloomberg. Here we use firms whose 
inside debt maturity is close to five years. The method used to impute DP and RR from 
CDS spreads follows Hull (2012, pages 554-555).24 For the sake of brevity, we do not 
detail here the test results of relating future stock return volatility and k* as measured 
using these alternative values of DP and RR. Instead, we merely report that the 
robustness test results are highly consistent with those reported in all of the tables that 
are presented here. Results are available upon request. Given the efficiency of the credit 
markets and the rarity of split ratings, it is not surprising that results are similar when 
adjusting inside debt using data from different major ratings firms as well as CDS 
spreads. The values of the product [DP x (1 – RR)] obtained from different rating 
agencies, as well as from CDS spreads, are all highly correlated.25 
                                                 
24 DP can be readily implied from CDS spreads. To obtain RR, we rely on the empirical fact that implied 
default probabilities are approximately proportional to 1/(1 – RR). 
25 It is plausible that more credit risky firms are more conservative due to their debt restrictions/covenants, 
rather than because of CEO choice/inside debt. However, tests involving raw-k already reflect restrictions 
associated with the firm’s outside debt. Since it is the same debt for both tests involving k* and k, the 
result that k* fits better than k suggests that executives must be more conservative, even if their outside 
debt precludes aggression. We show incremental explanatory power when using k*.  
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In unreported tests, we examined the other three k measures in Cassell et al. 
(2011): k_indicator, k_relative, k_relative_CA. We obtained similar comparative results 
by adjusting for the credit risk of the inside debt in each of the three cases. Different 
forms of k* perform consistently better than comparable forms of k, especially for firms 
with weaker credit. 
We next investigate the possibility that a change in CEO may be driving our 
result that CEO aggression is inversely related to k*. For all tests reported in Tables 3-7, 
we separately investigate the 1,506 sample firms that experienced no change in CEO 
during the test period and find no difference in test results. For example, consistent with 
results reported in Table 6, k* outperforms k for non-investment grade firms within these 
1,506 firms. This suggests that the possibility of differing degrees of managerial risk 
aversion, occasioned by CEO turnover, does not change our findings. Once again, our 
metric k* shows improvement over k in explaining future equity return volatility.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory of inside debt incentives predicts that more 
(less) credit risk-adjusted inside debt – and not merely the level of inside debt per se – 
motivates executives to be more (less) conservative. In this framework, our study makes 
three contributions to the literature on executive aggression and inside debt. First, to our 
knowledge, our study is the first one to provide a metric that reflects a credit risk-
adjusted level of inside debt, and is therefore conceptually superior to previously used 
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metrics. Second, we show that the relation between our metric and future equity 
volatility is statistically and economically stronger than previously used metrics, 
especially for high-credit risk firms. In particular, we construct a metric, k*, that 
accounts for the credit risk-adjusted level of inside debt, and find that it is more 
powerfully related to corporate conservatism (as captured by future firm equity return 
volatility) than the commonly used raw-k metric. This relationship is more prominent for 
non-investment grade firms, firms experiencing a credit downgrade, and firms with high 
credit risk. As such, inferences from our study are important to researchers, practitioners, 
and policy makers when addressing the issue of optimal executive compensation, 
especially the use of inside debt. Third, we show that the relation between executive 
conservatism and inside debt heightens during the credit crisis. 
Future research efforts should examine the relation between other corporate 
policies, such as accounting conservatism, tax aggression, diversification, research and 
development expenditures, and asset liquidity, and our k* metric, as well as the relation 
between corporate governance and the credit quality of inside debt. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample period of 2006-2010. Variable calculation methodology and definitions are provided in Appendices A and B. 
  N Mean Std.Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Log of total risk t+1 1,984 -7.35 1.01 -8.08 -7.45 -6.69 
Log of total risk t+1 to t+3 1,984 -7.28 1.10 -7.96 -7.35 -6.75 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 1,984 -7.89 1.07 -8.66 -8.02 -7.25 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 to t+3 1,984 -7.78 1.21 -8.51 -7.88 -7.24 
       CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) 1,984 2.21 6.68 0.16 0.60 1.67 
Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity (k*) 1,984 2.12 6.25 0.15 0.57 1.62 
CEO stock holdings ($thousands) 1,984 56,057.67 206,216.95 5,413.24 13,386.34 30,479.49 
CEO option holdings ($thousands) 1,984 19,891.86 34,112.71 1,766.89 8,238.87 21,868.28 
CEO equity holdings (CEO EH) ($thousands) 1,984 76,280.85 220,369.06 10,770.34 25,121.22 56,466.95 
Total current comp (salary+bonus)($thousands) 1,984 1,225.81 952.56 800 1,000 1,249.02 
CEO vega ($thousands) 1,984 207.07 270.71 31.34 105.35 272.23 
CEO delta ($thousands) 1,984 856.63 2,276.79 117.91 299.28 719.24 
CEO vega/delta ratio 1,984 9.31 26.02 0.57 1.85 5.68 
       Annual return 1,984 0.06 0.53 -0.22 0.04 0.24 
Total assets ($millions) 1,984 16,517.89 36,401.95 2,670.47 5,900.46 16,921.54 
Cash surplus 1,984 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.11 
Debt/equity ratio 1,984 0.76 2.33 0.15 0.33 0.71 
Market-to-book ratio 1,984 2.61 4.73 1.36 1.99 3.18 
Sales Growth 1,984 1.05 0.19 0.97 1.05 1.12 
Firm age (years) 1,984 37.18 18.11 19.01 39.02 57.04 
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Table 2 Association between the relative CEO debt-to equity ratio and the volatility of future stock returns  
This table presents OLS regression results for our sample period of 2006-2010 in which the dependent variable is Log of total risk or Log of idiosyncratic risk. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is measured in year t+1, and in Panel B, the dependent variable is measured in years t+1 through t+3. Variable calculation 
methodology and definitions are provided in Appendices A and B. For detailed definitions of the four k measures, please refer to Cassell et al. (2011). Each 
model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1     Log of total risk t+1     
 
k k_indicator k_relative k_relative_CA k k_indicator k_relative k_relative_CA 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0327*** 
   
-0.0322*** 
   
 
(-3.46) 
   
(-3.94) 
   
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>1 -0.0836** 
   
-0.0778*** 
  
  
(-2.50) 
   
(-2.67) 
  
Log of CEO relative incentive ratio -0.0210** 
   
-0.0214** 
 
   
(-2.15) 
   
(-2.54) 
 
Log of CEO relative incentive ratio CA 
  
-0.0026 
   
-0.0043 
    
(-0.28) 
   
(-0.53) 
Annual return 0.1036*** 0.1051*** 0.1066*** 0.1096*** 0.0855*** 0.0872*** 0.0883*** 0.0912*** 
 
-5.26 -5.35 -5.43 -5.61 -4.98 -5.1 -5.16 -5.37 
Cash surplus -2.3452*** -2.4161*** -2.4091*** -2.4905*** -2.3214*** -2.3958*** -2.3811*** -2.458*** 
 
(-9.59) (-9.85) (-9.80) (-10.08) (-11.53) (-11.81) (-11.78) (-12.12) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0007* 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0002 
 
(-1.44) -0.04 (-0.70) -0.6 (-1.70) (-0.02) (-0.93) -0.53 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1493*** 0.1523*** 0.1517*** 0.1544*** 0.1216*** 0.1246*** 0.1238*** 0.1263*** 
 
-11.4 -11.58 -11.47 -11.6 -10.98 -11.14 -11.03 -11.13 
Log of firm age -0.1331*** -0.1375*** -0.1386*** -0.1459*** -0.076*** -0.0808*** -0.0811*** -0.0881*** 
 
(-4.04) (-4.16) (-4.19) (-4.40) (-2.73) (-2.90) (-2.90) (-3.16) 
Log of total assets -0.1959*** -0.1936*** -0.1952*** -0.1922*** -0.1693*** -0.167*** -0.1688*** -0.1663*** 
 
(-14.02) (-13.77) (-13.86) (-13.27) (-13.60) (-13.33) (-13.40) (-12.79) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0368 -0.0386 -0.0373 -0.0393 -0.0238 -0.0257 -0.0242 -0.0259 
 
(-1.01) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.08) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-0.78) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0123*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0125*** -0.01*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.0102*** 
 
(-3.54) (-3.62) (-3.59) (-3.64) (-3.20) (-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.25) 
Sales growth -0.0547 -0.0566 -0.052 -0.0504 -0.0771 -0.0785 -0.0744 -0.0732 
 
(-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-1.18) (-1.20) (-1.14) (-1.11) 
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Intercept -5.6813*** -5.6149*** -5.6584*** -5.6339*** -5.3223*** -5.2582*** -5.3005*** -5.2728*** 
 (-16.01) (-15.83) (-16.07) (-16.19) (-20.09) (-20.03) (-20.11) (-20.21) 
N 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.62  0.61  0.61  0.61  
 
 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3     Log of total risk t+3     
 
k k_indicator k_relative k_relative_CA k k_indicator k_relative k_relative_CA 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0327*** 
   
-0.0310*** 
   
 
(-2.77) 
   
(-3.10) 
   
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>1 -0.0987** 
   
-0.0856** 
  
  
(-2.47) 
   
(-2.54) 
  
Log of CEO relative incentive ratio -0.0204* 
   
-0.0199* 
 
   
(-1.66) 
   
(-1.90) 
 
    
0.0053 
   
0.0016 
    
(0.46) 
   
(0.16) 
Annual return 0.0714*** 0.072*** 0.0744*** 0.0782*** 0.0424** 0.0434** 0.0452** 0.0485** 
 
(2.74) (2.78) (2.87) (3.04) (1.99) (2.05) (2.13) (2.31) 
Cash surplus -3.0006*** -3.0559*** -3.0665*** -3.175*** -2.9305*** -2.991*** -2.9906*** -3.083*** 
 
(-8.47) (-8.60) (-8.61) (-8.85) (-10.24) (-10.34) (-10.41) (-10.63) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005 
 
(-0.49) (0.53) (0.05) (1.06) (-0.74) (0.45) (-0.16) (0.98) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.2141*** 0.2167*** 0.2166*** 0.22*** 0.1876*** 0.1902*** 0.1898*** 0.1928*** 
 
(9.33) (9.45) (9.41) (9.57) (8.90) (9.04) (8.99) (9.15) 
Log of firm age -0.1281*** -0.1308*** -0.1337*** -0.143*** -0.0831** -0.0865** -0.0882** -0.0962*** 
 
(-3.04) (-3.09) (-3.17) (-3.39) (-2.38) (-2.46) (-2.52) (-2.76) 
Log of total assets -0.1895*** -0.1877*** -0.1888*** -0.183*** -0.1745*** -0.1726*** -0.1739*** -0.1696*** 
 
(-10.05) (-9.98) (-9.94) (-9.47) (-10.85) (-10.75) (-10.72) (-10.23) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) 0.0113 0.0097 0.0107 0.007 0.0209 0.0192 0.0204 0.0176 
 
(0.22) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.48) (0.44) (0.47) (0.41) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0175*** -0.0175*** -0.0176*** -0.0177*** -0.0148*** -0.0148*** -0.0149*** -0.015*** 
 
(-3.74) (-3.80) (-3.78) (-3.83) (-3.59) (-3.63) (-3.62) (-3.65) 
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Sales growth -0.1197 -0.1227 -0.1168 -0.1137 -0.1156 -0.1179 -0.113 -0.1107 
 
(-1.27) (-1.30) (-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.42) (-1.38) 
Intercept -6.3011*** -6.2306*** -6.2777*** -6.2664*** -5.9439*** -5.8793*** -5.9223*** -5.9054*** 
 (-15.91) (-15.72) (-15.92) (-15.92) (-18.34) (-18.23) (-18.34) (-18.27) 
N 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 3,899 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51  0.51  0.50  0.50  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 3 Comparison between k and k* as measure of CEO inside debt - OLS 
This table presents OLS regression results for our sample period of 2006-2010 in which the dependent variable is Log of total risk or Log of idiosyncratic risk 
and the independent variables of interest are two inside debt measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). In 
Columns 1-2, the dependent variable is measured in year t+1. In Columns 3-4 the dependent variable is measured in years t+1 through t+3. Variable calculation 
methodology and definitions are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Each model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Log of total risk t+1 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1    Log of total risk t+3 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3 
Controls k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0467*** 
 
-0.0435*** 
 
-0.0397** 
 
-0.0342* 
 
 
(-3.74) 
 
(-3.14) 
 
(-2.49) 
 
(-1.87) 
 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
 
-0.0460*** 
 
-0.0424*** 
 
-0.0393** 
 
-0.0338* 
  
(-3.68) 
 
(-3.07) 
 
(-2.46) 
 
(-1.85) 
Annual return 0.0969*** 0.097*** 0.1226*** 0.1227*** 0.0439 0.0439 0.0782** 0.0783** 
 
(3.57) (3.58) (3.97) (3.97) (1.24) (1.24) (2.02) (2.02) 
Cash surplus -2.5753*** -2.5824*** -2.3046*** -2.3133*** -3.5382*** -3.5428*** -3.3501*** -3.3543*** 
 
(-8.47) (-8.49) (-6.19) (-6.22) (-7.38) (-7.39) (-5.88) (-5.89) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 
 
(-1.24) (-1.18) (-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.05) (-0.03) (0.30) (0.32) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1017*** 0.1018*** 0.1231*** 0.1233*** 0.1847*** 0.1847*** 0.2105*** 0.2106*** 
 
(9.90) (9.91) (10.67) (10.68) (7.00) (7.00) (7.48) (7.49) 
Log of firm age -0.1346*** -0.1351*** -0.1726*** -0.1732*** -0.1512*** -0.1515*** -0.1905*** -0.1908*** 
 
(-3.38) (-3.40) (-3.68) (-3.69) (-3.26) (-3.27) (-3.42) (-3.42) 
Log of total assets -0.1174*** -0.1177*** -0.132*** -0.1323*** -0.1176*** -0.1178*** -0.1219*** -0.1221*** 
 
(-6.19) (-6.20) (-6.35) (-6.36) (-4.95) (-4.96) (-4.48) (-4.49) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0336 -0.0343 -0.0524 -0.053 0.0174 0.0168 0.0087 0.0082 
 
(-0.76) (-0.77) (-1.13) (-1.14) (0.32) (0.31) (0.15) (0.14) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0049* -0.0049* -0.0063** -0.0063** -0.0057* -0.0057* -0.0065* -0.0065* 
 
(-1.69) (-1.69) (-2.01) (-2.01) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.77) (-1.77) 
Sales growth -0.0665 -0.0668 -0.0782 -0.0784 0.0246 0.0243 -0.0064 -0.0066 
 
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.67) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Intercept -5.6789*** -5.6671*** -6.111*** -6.0993*** -6.3439*** -6.3343*** -6.7045*** -6.6962*** 
 
(-18.72) (-18.71) (-18.72) (-18.72) (-16.99) (-16.98) (-15.99) (-15.99) 
N 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 
Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.53 
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Table 4 Horse Race: k vs. k*  
This table presents results based on OLS regressions in Panel A and Ridge regressions in Panel B. The dependent variable is the Log of total risk or Log of 
idiosyncratic risk and the independent variables are our two inside debt measures: Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and Log of Adjusted CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio (k*). Variable calculation methodology and definitions are provided in Appendices A and B. Each model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and 
year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+1 
Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+3 
Log of total risk 
t+1 
Log of total risk 
t+3 
Collinearity 
Statistics (VIF) 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.4384* -0.1256 -0.3089 -0.1554 804.437 
 
(-1.80) (-0.46) (-1.30) (-0.61) 
 Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.3882 0.084 0.2617 0.1122 801.177 
 
(1.59) (0.31) (1.10) (0.44) 
 CEO Vega/delta ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.0009 -0.0002 1.459 
 
(-1.46) (-0.01) (-1.35) (-0.17)  
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.064 0.0034 -0.0393 0.0171 1.649 
 
(-1.35) (0.05) (-0.88) (0.30)  
Log of firm age -0.16*** -0.1849*** -0.1055** -0.1284** 1.417 
 
(-3.17) (-3.08) (-2.48) (-2.57)  
Log of total assets -0.1381*** -0.129*** -0.1272*** -0.1271*** 1.831 
 
(-6.28) (-4.82) (-6.38) (-5.34)  
Market-to-book ratio -0.0063** -0.0061* -0.005* -0.0053 1.138 
 
(-2.03) (-1.66) (-1.68) (-1.53)  
Sales growth -0.0456 0.0375 -0.0468 0.0581 1.382 
 
(-0.39) (0.23) (-0.48) (0.41)  
Annual return 0.1185*** 0.0735* 0.1004*** 0.047 1.407 
 
(3.97) (1.94) (3.72) (1.32)  
Debt/equity ratio 0.1213*** 0.2099*** 0.1005*** 0.1844*** 1.221 
 
(10.42) (7.48) (9.65) (6.90)  
Cash surplus -2.3405*** -3.4269*** -2.5275*** -3.543*** 1.486 
 
(-6.05) (-5.66) (-8.04) (-6.94) 
 Intercept -5.9097*** -6.6957*** -5.5583*** -6.3653*** 
 
 
(-16.51) (-13.87) (-17.10) (-15.23) 
 N 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.53 0.61 0.57   
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Panel B Ridge Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+1 
Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+3 
Log of total risk t+1 Log of total risk t+3 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0503*** -0.0264** -0.0448*** -0.0301** 
 
(-3.43) (-2.00) (-2.85) (-1.99) 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0009 -0.017 -0.003 -0.0141 
 
(-0.06) (-1.28) (-0.19) (-0.93) 
CEO Vega/delta Ratio -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0002 
 
(-1.37) (-0.07) (-1.31) (-0.28) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0695* -0.001 -0.0429 0.0136 
 
(-1.76) (-0.02) (-1.21) (0.33) 
Log of firm age -0.1617*** -0.1851*** -0.1069*** -0.1297*** 
 
(-5.63) (-5.52) (-4.16) (-4.38) 
Log of total assets -0.1408*** -0.1288*** -0.1289*** -0.1275*** 
 
(-8.58) (-6.75) (-8.75) (-7.53) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0061* -0.0057 -0.005 -0.0051 
 
(-1.73) (-1.39) (-1.58) (-1.39) 
Sales growth -0.0485 0.0329 -0.0475 0.0528 
 
(-0.49) (0.29) (-0.54) (0.52) 
Annual return 0.1094*** 0.0646 0.0945*** 0.0411 
 
(3.14) (1.59) (3.02) (1.14) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1202*** 0.2068*** 0.0998*** 0.1826*** 
 
(16.26) (23.93) (15.07) (23.94) 
Cash surplus -2.3257*** -3.3675*** -2.5119*** -3.4978*** 
 
(-8.49) (-10.54) (-10.24) (-12.38) 
Intercept -5.9502*** -6.5685*** -5.6198*** -6.3009*** 
 
(-20.99) (-20.08) (-21.88) (-21.54) 
N 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.52 0.61 0.56 
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Table 5 Comparison between k and k* as measure of CEO inside debt - 2SLS  
This table presents the results of our 2SLS analysis for 2006-2010 in which the dependent variable is Log of total risk or Log of idiosyncratic risk and the 
independent variables of interest are two inside debt measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). In Columns 1-
2, the dependent variable is measured in year t+1. In Columns 3-4 the dependent variable is measured in years t+1 through t+3. We first regress k and k* on our 
instruments and then use the predicted values from the first-stage regression results as explanatory variables. In our first-stage regression we exclude CEO age 
because it is used to calculate k*.Variable calculation methodology and definitions are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B. Each model includes industry 
(two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
2nd  stage results (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log of total risk t+1 Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+1 
Log of total risk t+3 Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+3 
Controls k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.1694*** 
 
-0.2548*** 
 
-0.2232*** 
 
-0.3008*** 
 
 
(-4.29) 
 
(-5.37) 
 
(-4.75) 
 
(-5.36) 
 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
 
-0.1654*** 
 
-0.2507*** 
 
-0.2185*** 
 
-0.2966*** 
 
 
(-4.15) 
 
(-5.23) 
 
(-4.62) 
 
(-5.25) 
Annual return 0.1275*** 0.1278*** 0.1492*** 0.1496*** 0.0736* 0.0739* 0.1022** 0.1026** 
 
(3.63) (3.66) (3.54) (3.57) (1.76) (1.78) (2.05) (2.07) 
Cash surplus -2.6922*** -2.695*** -2.4594*** -2.4629*** -3.6429*** -3.6462*** -3.4477*** -3.4515*** 
 
(-9.99) (-10.04) (-7.60) (-7.64) (-11.37) (-11.43) (-9.01) (-9.06) 
CEO vega/delta ratio 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0012* 0.0012* 0.0013 0.0014 
 
(1.23) (1.26) (0.94) (0.97) (1.66) (1.69) (1.51) (1.54) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1018*** 0.102*** 0.1218*** 0.1219*** 0.1844*** 0.1846*** 0.2087*** 0.2089*** 
 
(13.94) (14.01) (13.87) (13.95) (21.24) (21.36) (20.13) (20.23) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.2241*** -0.2263*** -0.2729*** -0.2762*** -0.166*** -0.1689*** -0.1888*** -0.1926*** 
 
(-6.59) (-6.68) (-6.68) (-6.79) (-4.11) (-4.20) (-3.91) (-4.01) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0061 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.0059 
 
(-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
Sales growth -0.0275 -0.0266 -0.02 -0.0189 0.0768 0.0778 0.0649 0.0659 
 
(-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.17) (-0.16) (0.65) (0.66) (0.46) (0.47) 
N 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55  0.55  0.47  0.47  0.49  0.49  0.43  0.44  
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1st stage results (1) (2) 
Controls k k* 
Annual return -0.18** -0.1792** 
 
(-2.43) (-2.42) 
Cash surplus 5.5275*** 5.5801*** 
 
(9.14) (9.21) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0343*** -0.0344*** 
 
(-26.11) (-26.16) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.1411*** -0.1407*** 
 
(-8.99) (-8.95) 
Liquidity constraint 0.3381* 0.3305* 
 
(1.69) (1.65) 
Log of firm age 0.2876*** 0.2941*** 
 
(4.74) (4.83) 
Log of total assets -0.0286 -0.0221 
 
(-0.81) (-0.62) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0371 -0.0212 
 
(-0.44) (-0.25) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0014 0.0015 
 
(0.19) (0.20) 
New CEO -0.0828 -0.1082 
 
(-0.78) (-1.02) 
Sales growth -0.0112 -0.0045 
 
(-0.05) (-0.02) 
State wage tax rate 3.2625*** 3.1479*** 
 
(2.74) (2.64) 
Tax status -0.3009*** -0.3011*** 
 
(-4.02) (-4.01) 
N 1,984 1,984 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 6 Investment versus Non-investment grade 
This table presents the OLS regression results in which the dependent variable is Log of total risk t+1, and the independent variables are the two inside debt 
measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). In this table, we split the sample into investment grade group (Baa3 
or above, Moody’s) in columns 1-2 and non-investment grade group (below Baa3, Moody’s) in columns 3-4. Variable definitions are provided in Appendices A 
and B. Each model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Investment grade Non-investment grade 
  Log of total risk t+1 Log of total risk t+1 
Controls k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0425***   -0.0477** 
 
 
(-2.70)   (-2.19) 
 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0425*** 
 
-0.0460** 
 
 
(-2.71) 
 
(-2.10) 
Annual return 0.0946** 0.0946** 0.0031 0.003 
 
(2.56) (2.55) (0.04) (0.04) 
Cash surplus -2.046*** -2.0467*** -2.488*** -2.4923*** 
 
(-5.64) (-5.64) (-5.03) (-5.05) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.0019 0.002 
 
(-1.31) (-1.31) (1.35) (1.44) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1041*** 0.1041*** 0.1267*** 0.127*** 
 
(9.89) (9.88) (6.47) (6.46) 
Log of firm age -0.1888*** -0.1889*** -6.0234*** -6.007*** 
 
(-4.05) (-4.06) (-11.92) (-11.89) 
Log of total assets -0.1574*** -0.1574*** -0.1763** -0.1766** 
 
(-6.57) (-6.57) (-2.59) (-2.59) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) 0.099* 0.0987* -0.0914*** -0.0905*** 
 
(1.85) (1.85) (-2.67) (-2.65) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0072** -0.0072** -0.0009 -0.0034 
 
(-2.23) (-2.23) (-0.01) (-0.05) 
Sales growth 0.001 0.0012 0.0064 0.0065 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (1.43) (1.43) 
Intercept -6.2467*** -6.243*** -0.0877 -0.0896 
 
(-17.08) (-17.08) (-0.56) (-0.58) 
N 1,528 1,528 456 456 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.69 0.69 
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Table 7 Downgrades 
This table reports OLS analysis for 410 firms that experienced a credit rating downgrade (of one or more “notches”). The dependent variables are Log of 
idiosyncratic risk t+1, Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3, Log of total risk t+1, Log of total risk t+3, and the principal independent variables are the two inside debt 
measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). Variable definitions are provided in Appendices A and B. Each 
model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1)                      (2) (3)                       (4) (5)                 (6) (7)                  (8) 
 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3 Log of total risk t+1 Log of total risk t+3 
  k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO 
 to firm debt/Equity ratio -0.0774** 
 
-0.0488 
 
-0.0764*** 
 
-0.0529 
   (-2.54) 
 
(-1.16) 
 
(-3.04) 
 
(-1.44) 
 Log of CEO to firm  
debt/Equity ratio -0.0754** 
 
-0.0484 
 
-0.0741*** 
 
-0.0525 
  
 
(-2.47) 
 
(-1.15) 
 
(-2.96) 
 
(-1.43) 
Annual Return 0.1439** 0.1447** 0.0609 0.0611 0.1241** 0.1249** 0.04 0.0403 
  (2.10) (2.11) (0.86) (0.86) (1.98) (1.99) (0.61) (0.61) 
Cash surplus -2.2184*** -2.2328*** -3.0774*** -3.0824*** -2.4262*** -2.4402*** -3.2086*** -3.2142*** 
  (-3.53) (-3.56) (-2.95) (-2.96) (-4.58) (-4.61) (-3.39) (-3.40) 
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0049 0.0049 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0041 0.0041 
  (-0.40) (-0.35) (1.18) (1.19) (-0.47) (-0.40) (1.24) (1.26) 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.123*** 0.1233*** 0.229*** 0.2291*** 0.1018*** 0.102*** 0.2033*** 0.2034*** 
  (12.00) (12.01) (7.70) (7.70) (11.07) (11.08) (6.81) (6.82) 
Intercept -7.2077*** -7.1729*** -7.7588*** -7.7385*** -6.4101*** -6.376*** -7.0521*** -7.03*** 
  (-10.69) (-10.57) (-9.15) (-9.09) (-10.95) (-10.84) (-9.20) (-9.15) 
Log of firm age -0.0935 -0.0954 -0.1414 -0.1423 -0.0393 -0.0412 -0.0844 -0.0854 
  (-0.88) (-0.89) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.82) (-0.83) 
Log of total assets -0.107*** -0.1069*** -0.1381*** -0.1381*** -0.0967*** -0.0966*** -0.1311*** -0.131*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.66) (-3.13) (-3.13) (-2.75) (-2.75) (-3.41) (-3.41) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0217 -0.0247 0.0216 0.0197 -0.039 -0.0419 -0.0077 -0.0098 
  (-0.26) (-0.30) (0.22) (0.20) (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.08) (-0.11) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0067 0.0068 0.0189 0.019 0.0048 0.0048 0.0114 0.0114 
  (1.27) (1.28) (1.49) (1.50) (0.73) (0.74) (0.89) (0.90) 
Sales Growth 0.0055 0.0014 0.5505 0.5476 0.0352 0.0311 0.5467 0.5436 
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(0.02) (0.01) (1.03) (1.03) (0.17) (0.15) (1.12) (1.11) 
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.7 0.7 0.67 0.67 
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Table 8 Above versus Below Median 1-DP*(1-RR) 
This table presents OLS regression results in which the dependent variable is the Log of total risk or Log of idiosyncratic risk and the independent variables are 
our inside debt measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). We split the sample into two subsamples: above 
median 1-DP*(1-RR) in Panel A and below median 1-DP*(1-RR) in Panel B. Variable calculation methodology and definitions are provided in Appendices A 
and B. Each model includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Above Median Subsample (Safe Firms) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3 Log of total risk t+1 Log of total risk t+3 
  k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0422** 
 
-0.0311 
 
-0.0431** 
 
-0.0352* 
 
 
(-2.26) 
 
(-1.28) 
 
(-2.57) 
 
(-1.68) 
 Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
 
-0.0421** 
 
-0.0312 
 
-0.0431** 
 
-0.0352* 
  
(-2.26) 
 
(-1.28) 
 
(-2.58) 
 
(-1.68) 
Annual return 0.0965 0.0966 0.0081 0.0081 0.0743 0.0744 -0.0025 -0.0024 
 
(1.59) (1.59) (0.11) (0.11) (1.34) (1.35) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Cash surplus -2.0458*** -2.0474*** -3.9605*** -3.9611*** -2.2594*** -2.2606*** -4.103*** -4.1035*** 
 
(-4.02) (-4.03) (-5.84) (-5.85) (-5.29) (-5.29) (-6.03) (-6.03) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 
 
(-0.77) (-0.76) (0.52) (0.52) (-0.94) (-0.94) (0.37) (0.37) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1127*** 0.1127*** 0.1975*** 0.1975*** 0.0902*** 0.0902*** 0.1729*** 0.1728*** 
 
(7.80) (7.80) (4.72) (4.72) (7.11) (7.11) (4.38) (4.38) 
Log of firm age -0.1275** -0.1277** -0.1564** -0.1565** -0.0486 -0.0487 -0.071 -0.0711 
 
(-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.16) (-1.16) 
Log of total assets -0.1262*** -0.1262*** -0.1296*** -0.1296*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.1399*** -0.1399*** 
 
(-4.24) (-4.24) (-3.28) (-3.28) (-4.74) (-4.74) (-4.01) (-4.01) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.1242** -0.1244** 0.0133 0.0131 -0.0845 -0.0847 0.0358 0.0356 
 
(-2.03) (-2.03) (0.14) (0.14) (-1.47) (-1.47) (0.45) (0.45) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0072* -0.0072* -0.0089** -0.0089** -0.0067* -0.0067* -0.0071** -0.0071** 
 
(-1.69) (-1.69) (-2.57) (-2.57) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-2.27) (-2.27) 
Sales growth -0.0298 -0.0297 -0.1369 -0.1369 0.0675 0.0676 -0.036 -0.036 
 
(-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.62) (-0.62) (0.44) (0.44) (-0.20) (-0.20) 
Intercept -5.3257*** -5.3215*** -6.908*** -6.905*** -5.3817*** -5.3774*** -6.9128*** -6.9093*** 
 
(-10.85) (-10.85) (-9.04) (-9.04) (-11.80) (-11.80) (-10.63) (-10.63) 
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N 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54  0.54  0.51  0.51  0.60  0.60  0.55  0.55  
 
 
Panel B Below Median Subsample (Risky firms) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3 Log of total risk t+1 Log of total risk t+3 
  k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0702*** 
 
-0.0557* 
 
-0.0626*** 
 
-0.0532** 
 
 
(-3.34) 
 
(-1.94) 
 
(-3.25) 
 
(-2.02) 
 Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
 
-0.069*** 
 
-0.0554* 
 
-0.0616*** 
 
-0.0527** 
  
(-3.29) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(-3.21) 
 
(-1.98) 
Annual return 0.1036*** 0.1036*** 0.0779* 0.0778* 0.0953*** 0.0953*** 0.0572 0.0571 
 
(2.83) (2.83) (1.73) (1.72) (3.05) (3.05) (1.36) (1.35) 
Cash surplus -2.2067*** -2.2102*** -2.3501*** -2.3509*** -2.405*** -2.4081*** -2.5396*** -2.541*** 
 
(-3.87) (-3.88) (-3.07) (-3.07) (-5.22) (-5.23) (-3.98) (-3.98) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 
(-1.59) (-1.54) (-1.03) 
 
(-1.35) (-1.29) (-0.98) (-0.95) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.1357*** 0.136*** 0.2277*** 0.2278*** 0.1174*** 0.1176*** 0.2039*** 0.2041*** 
 
(6.76) (6.77) (8.29) (8.30) (6.66) (6.67) (7.78) (7.80) 
Log of firm age -0.1647** -0.1648** -0.1934** -0.1934** -0.1428** -0.1429** -0.1654** -0.1654** 
 
(-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.42) (-2.42) (-2.43) (-2.43) 
Log of total assets -0.1122*** -0.1119*** -0.1069*** -0.1068*** -0.0999*** -0.0997*** -0.102*** -0.1018*** 
 
(-3.34) (-3.33) (-3.20) (-3.20) (-3.28) (-3.27) (-3.48) (-3.47) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) -0.0068 -0.0097 -0.0114 -0.0136 -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0122 -0.0143 
 
(-0.11) (-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.22) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.20) (-0.24) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.002 -0.002 0.0043 0.0043 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0029 0.0029 
 
(-0.51) (-0.50) (0.62) (0.62) (-0.12) (-0.12) (0.43) (0.43) 
Sales growth -0.0243 -0.026 0.2481 0.2468 -0.1066 -0.1081 0.1904 0.1891 
 
(-0.18) (-0.20) (1.05) (1.05) (-0.94) (-0.96) (0.88) (0.87) 
Intercept -6.7648*** -6.7402*** -6.9453*** -6.9262*** -5.9804*** -5.9584*** -6.2376*** -6.2193*** 
 (-14.46) (-14.41) (-14.18) (-14.10) (-14.17) (-14.13) (-14.38) (-14.29) 
N 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.61  0.61  0.57  0.57  0.64  0.64  0.60  0.60  
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Table 9 Credit Crisis Test - 2SLS  
This table presents the results of our 2SLS regression analysis for 2006-2010, in which the dependent variable is Log of total risk t+1 or Log of idiosyncratic risk 
t+1 and the independent variables of interest are two inside debt measures: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*). We 
separate our sample into two sub-periods, the crisis period (2007 and 2008) in Columns 1-4 and the non-crisis period (2006, 2009 and 2010) in Columns 5-8. We 
first regress k and k* on our instruments and then use the predicted values from the first-stage regression as explanatory variables in the second stage. In the first 
stage we exclude CEO age because it is used to calculate k*. Variable calculation methodology and definitions are provided in Appendices A and B. Each model 
includes industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
2nd  stage results (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Crisis Period Non-crisis Period 
 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 
 
Log of total risk t+1 
  
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 Log of total risk t+1 
Controls k* k k* k k* k k* k 
Log of Adjusted CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio 
-0.2497*** 
 
-0.1879***   -0.2622*** 
 
-0.1355** 
 
 
(-3.80) 
 
(-3.30)   (-3.73) 
 
(-2.58) 
 
Log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.2472*** 
 
-0.1861*** 
 
-0.2559*** 
 
-0.1282** 
  
(-3.74) 
 
(-3.24) 
 
(-3.59) 
 
(-2.41) 
Annual return -0.2635** -0.2633** -0.3607*** -0.3606*** 0.2547*** 0.2552*** 0.2666*** 0.2671*** 
 
(-2.52) (-2.52) (-3.98) (-3.98) (5.57) (5.63) (7.80) (7.87) 
Cash surplus -3.315*** -3.314*** -3.3346*** -3.3338*** -1.2068*** -1.215*** -1.7011*** -1.7064*** 
 
(-6.43) (-6.44) (-7.46) (-7.47) (-2.71) (-2.75) (-5.11) (-5.17) 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 
 
(-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.54) (-0.53) (2.28) (2.32) (2.77) (2.81) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.0999*** 0.0999*** 0.0797*** 0.0797*** 0.3509*** 0.351*** 0.2749*** 0.2751*** 
 
(10.13) (10.15) (9.32) (9.34) (8.00) (8.08) (8.39) (8.46) 
Log of total current 
comp(salary+bonus) 
-0.2147*** -0.2179*** -0.1896*** -0.1921*** -0.3163*** -0.3197*** -0.2467*** -0.2486*** 
 
(-3.38) (-3.43) (-3.44) (-3.49) (-5.90) (-6.02) (-6.16) (-6.26) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0026 
 
(-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.59) (-0.59) 
Sales growth -0.0529 -0.0518 0.1042 0.105 0.2075 0.2088 0.1082 0.1093 
 
(-0.29) (-0.28) (0.66) (0.66) (1.24) (1.25) (0.86) (0.88) 
N 887 887 887 887 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35  0.35  0.43  0.43  0.28  0.29  0.38  0.38  
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1st stage results (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Crisis Period Non-crisis Period 
Controls k k* k k* 
CEO vega/delta ratio -0.0299*** -0.0301*** -0.0395*** -0.0397*** 
 
(-15.91) (-15.99) (-20.96) (-21.00) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) 0.0074 0.0276 -0.0559 -0.0444 
 
(0.06) (0.21) (-0.51) (-0.40) 
Log of firm age 0.3954*** 0.4009*** 0.192** 0.1985** 
 
(4.20) (4.26) (2.46) (2.53) 
Log of total assets -0.0453 -0.0403 -0.0183 -0.0103 
 
(-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.41) (-0.23) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0096 -0.0097 0.0077 0.008 
 
(-0.87) (-0.88) (0.74) (0.76) 
Sales growth 0.282 0.2808 -0.4804* -0.4618 
 
(0.88) (0.88) (-1.65) (-1.58) 
Annual return 0.0712 0.0721 -0.2015** -0.2015** 
 
(0.39) (0.40) (-2.53) (-2.53) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.114*** -0.1137*** -0.7429*** -0.7427*** 
 
(-6.42) (-6.40) (-9.77) (-9.74) 
Cash surplus 4.5033*** 4.591*** 4.8906*** 4.8933*** 
 
(4.68) (4.77) (6.03) (6.02) 
Tax status -0.3105** -0.3116** -0.2969*** -0.2972*** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.57) (-3.16) (-3.15) 
New CEO 0.0396 0.0205 -0.2134 -0.2486* 
 
(0.25) (0.13) (-1.46) (-1.69) 
Liquidity constraint 0.2855 0.2912 0.1732 0.148 
 
(0.98) (1.00) (0.60) (0.51) 
State wage tax rate 3.4687* 3.3739* 2.598* 2.4907* 
 
(1.78) (1.73) (1.77) (1.70) 
N 887 887 1,097 1,097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.47 0.47 
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Figure 1 
The graph in the top left presents the average of the difference between raw CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k) and adjusted CEO to firm debt/equity ratio (k*) for 
different Moody’s credit ratings. The graph in the bottom left presents the average of the difference between k and k* during and outside of the credit crisis. The 
table on the right covers the full regression sample from 2006-2010 but the graphs only include observations where k*<10. For firms whose bonds' ratings are 
available, we use the reasonable rating that is selected according to our decision rules and for a firm without bonds’ ratings, we use the average rating of its 
comparable companies ("SIC two" and "Firm size").  
 
 
 
 
 
Mean (k-k*)  
Moody’s  Full Sample         Credit Crisis 
Non-Credit 
Crisis 
Aaa 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 
Aa1 0.0083 0.0020 0.0146 
Aa2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Aa3 0.0060 0.0106 0.0026 
A1 0.0184 0.0116 0.0239 
A2 0.0191 0.0109 0.0257 
A3 0.0117 0.0140 0.0100 
Baa1 0.0315 0.0307 0.0320 
Baa2 0.0230 0.0196 0.0261 
Baa3 0.0280 0.0273 0.0287 
Ba1 0.0529 0.0505 0.0554 
Ba2 0.0441 0.0446 0.0435 
Ba3 0.0605 0.0957 0.0404 
B1 0.0861 0.0707 0.1014 
B2 0.2089 0.2994 0.1637 
B3 0.0265 0.0396 0.0181 
Caa1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0319 
Caa2 0.3637 0.8615 0.0000 
Caa3 0.1531 0.0000 0.1531 
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[Appendix A] Details of CEO credit adjusted inside debt measure (k*) calculation 
In this appendix we provide the details of how k* is calculated by detailing each component of 
k* calculation.  
 
CEO Decision Horizon [CEO DH] 
We assume that all debt owed to the CEO is paid at CEO retirement. Absent detailed data 
on the inside debt itself (contract terms and such), we believe that this is a reasonable assumption 
that we are required to make. We also assume that inside debt owed to the CEO is unsecured 
(Cassell et al, 2012). We use publicly-traded debt rating to proxy for the credit quality of the 
inside debt owed to the CEO. In our empirical tests, we obtain the firm's credit rating on its 
senior and unsecured debt (with the “appropriate maturity”) and, therefore, the estimated default 
probability and recovery rate on that debt. The proxy for Maturity used is the CEO’s expected 
decision horizon with the firm (Antia, Pantzalis, and Park, 2010). 
𝐷𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡] + [𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡] 
The estimation of expected CEO DH requires information on CEO tenure. CEO tenure in 
a given year is determined as the length of time between the date when the person becomes the 
CEO (“becameceo” in EXECUCOMP) and the current fiscal year end. Following Chen and 
Zheng (2014), we further make the following corrections: (1) For those observations with 
missing values from the above calculation, if the CEO is hired from outside the firm and the date 
when the person joined the company (“joined_co” in EXECUCOMP) is available, CEO tenure in 
a given year is calculated as the length of time between “joined_co” and the current fiscal year 
end. Similar to Allgood and Farrell (2000), Farrell and Whidbee (2002), and Huson et al., 2004, a 
CEO is considered an outside hire if she joins the firm for less than two years at the time of 
succession and she is not a founder; (2) For those CEOs who held the position multiple times, 
EXECUCOMP only has the data for “becameceo” for either the first time or the most recent time 
the person became the CEO. Therefore, we manually check these cases and use the information 
that the previous CEO left the company to determine the data for “becameceo” for the CEO with 
multiple appointments.  
Following these amendments, for those CEOs whose tenure still can’t be determined, it is 
generally the case that the person became CEO too early to be covered by Execucomp 
(Execucomp coverage is from 1992-present). Therefore, we search these persons on the internet 
to determine the date they became CEO: if no specific date is available on the internet, but we 
know the year Y and the month M he became CEO, we assume that he became CEO on the first 
day of month M in year Y; if we only know the year he became CEO, we use the fiscal year 
beginning date in year Y; for the rest of CEOs, we use the date he joined company or the date he 
founded the company as the date he became CEO. After these adjustments, all CEO tenures are 
positive. In this process, we also find that there are cases when the CEO identification in 
Execucomp (CEOANN) is incorrect, we correct these cases by checking DEF 14A and annual 
title in Execucomp. 
Industry median Tenureind,t and Ageind,t values are computed at the two-digit SIC code 
level and all variables are measured at the end of year t.  
 
Default Probability and Recovery Rate [DP and RR] 
We provide detailed description of how we estimate the cumulative default probability and 
expected recovery rate. We use Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) to gather data 
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on bond ratings and maturities. Per assumptions made above, we need to identify senior and 
unsecured US corporate debt. More specifically, 
 
a) The variable Security_level in Mergent FISD indicates whether the security is a secured, 
senior or subordinated issue of the issuer. We set Security_level=”SEN” to identify senior 
issues.  
b) We focus on public debt issuance of corporate bonds, the Mergent FISD bond sample 
includes bond types CDEB, CMTN, CMTZ, CCOV, USBN, CS, CCPI, CZ and UCID.  
c) We also exclude (1) bonds that are foreign denominated, Yankee, Canadian entity issued, 
Rule 144a issues, issuances only offered privately to selected individuals and institutions; 
(2) bonds with credit enhancement, secured by one or more leases, collateralized by a 
portfolio of loans or assets; (3) bonds with equity-like features (perpetual, preferred 
security); (4) structured products; (5) bonds already in default. 
 
Moody's, S&P, and Fitch use similar but divergent systems of rating bond issues. The following 
table displays the reference codes used to integrate the rating systems. Mergent FISD (2012) 
employs comparable reference codes 1 through 25 in its database. We mainly use Moody’s rating 
because Moody’s provides expected recovery rates of different ratings publicly, while we can’t 
obtain cumulative default rates and expected recovery rates from S&P and Fitch. Therefore, 
unless otherwise stated, our discussions are all based on Moody’s ratings. We collect Moody’s 
reporting on cumulative default rate manually. Cumulative global default rates and recovery rates 
are available in Moody’s annual study report “Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-
2006”. 
 
Reference 
codes 
Fitch Rating S&P's Rating Moody's Rating 
1 AAA AAA Aaa 
2 AA+ AA+ Aa1 
3 AA AA 
Aa 
Aa2 
4 AA- AA- Aa3 
5 A+ A+ A1 
6 A A 
A 
A2 
7 A- A- A3 
8 BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 
9 BBB BBB 
Baa 
Baa2 
10 BBB- BBB- Baa3 
11 BB+ BB+ Ba1 
12 BB BB 
Ba 
Ba2 
13 BB- BB- Ba3 
14 B+ B+ B1 
15 B B 
B 
B2 
16 B- B- B3 
17 CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 
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18 CCC CCC 
Caa 
Caa2 
19 CCC- CCC- Caa3 
20 CC CC Ca 
21 C C C 
22       
23 DDD     
24 DD     
25 D D   
 
a) Cumulative default probability. 
Moody’s updates statistics on the cumulative global default rates both by letter ratings 
and by alphanumeric ratings since 1920 in their annual default study, while S&P 
provides cumulative global default rates only for letter rating. As mentioned above, 
we exclude bonds that have defaulted (reference code>21), and are only interested in 
reference codes 1 through 21. Therefore, consistent with the letter rating categories, 
we divide ratings into 8 groups, as shown in the table below. Moody’s provides 
cumulative default rates for years 1 through 20. For those bonds whose time to 
maturity is longer than 20 years, we use the default rate for 20 years. 
 
    
Rating Group Reference codes 
1 1 
2 2,3,4 
3 5,6,7 
4 8,9,10 
5 11,12,13 
6 14,15,16 
7 17,18,19 
8 20,21 
 
b) Recovery rates. 
Moody’s provides information on the recovery rates based on issuer rating at various 
points in time prior to default, but only for up to 5 years. For years>5, we use the 
recovery rates for year 5. The following table shows the cumulative default rates and 
expected recovery rates reported by Moody’s in 2011 (Source: “Average Cumulative 
Credit Loss Rates by Letter Rating, 1982-2011” in Moody’s “Corporate Default and 
Recovery Rates, 1920-2011”). For instance, according to this table the recovery rate 
of bonds rated AA at any point in time up to five years prior to default is 0.22%.  
 
Fiscal Year Rating Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
2011 AAA 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
2011 AA 0.01% 0.04% 0.09% 0.14% 0.22% 
2011 A 0.05% 0.13% 0.24% 0.37% 0.52% 
2011 Baa 0.12% 0.31% 0.56% 0.83% 1.12% 
2011 Ba 0.62% 1.80% 3.30% 4.95% 6.34% 
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2011 B 2.62% 6.30% 9.93% 13.05% 15.77% 
2011 Caa-C 10.89% 18.39% 24.51% 29.36% 33.61% 
* Based on average default rates and senior unsecured bond recoveries measured on issuer-weighted basis. 
 
[Maturity] 
By definition, time to-maturity (TTM) is the length of time until the expiration of the 
bond contract. We use two maturities in our empirical tests, initial maturity (TTM_initial) and 
remaining maturity (TTM_remain). Initial maturity is the time from bonds’ offering date to 
maturity, while remaining maturity is the difference between the rating date and maturity. For 
brevity, we only show results for TTM_type=initial as results for TTM_type=remain are quite 
similar.  
𝑇𝑇𝑀 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒) 365⁄
𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 = (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒) 365⁄
 
 
The rating we assign to firm A in year t is the most recent rating of the most “qualified” 
bonds issued by firm A. The most “qualified” bonds refer to the bonds that can best capture the 
maturity of CEO’s inside debt. 
As mentioned earlier, the CEO’s expected decision horizon (DH) adjusted for industry 
median age and industry median tenure (Antia, Pantzalis, and Park, 2010) can be positive or 
negative. When the CEO DH is not positive (DH<0) or near zero (rounded DH=0) (i.e., the CEO 
is older and/or has been in office for longer than the benchmark), we assume that they retire 
immediately, and no adjustments are needed. But for positive CEO DH, we adjust the inside debt 
holdings (VED) for expected cumulative default probability (DP) and expected recovery rate 
(RR). Formulaically,   
𝐸𝐿 = {
𝑉𝐸𝐷                                   𝐷𝐻 ≤ 0
𝑉𝐸𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝑃 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑅)     𝐷𝐻 > 0
 
For CEOs with positive DH, we determine the maturity of inside debt through comparing 
the CEO’s expected decision horizon(DH), the bond’s time-to-maturity (TTM) and the years to 
default (YTD) defined in Moody’s calculation of recovery rate for specific rating group (e.g., 
rating=AA group). As described above, YTD can be {1, 2, 3, 4, 5……19, 20}. Specifically, for 
CEOs with rounded (DH)>0, the final proxy of the maturity of inside debt (Maturity) is arrived at 
using the following rules applied in order:  
 
a) We choose Moody’s latest credit rating of bonds (bonds whose rating date is closest to 
firms’ fiscal year end date.) 
b) Conditional on a), we choose the issue whose abs (DH-TTM) is the smallest. 
c) Conditional on b), if there are issues satisfying abs (DH-TTM)<=1, which means that 
there is a bond whose TTM is almost the same as CEO’s expected decision horizon, we 
use the default probability and recovery rate of YTD whose abs(YTD-TTM) is the 
smallest.  
d) Conditional on b), if abs(DH-TTM)>1 for all issues, which means that there isn’t any bond 
of the firm whose TTM is very close to CEO’s expected decision horizon, we calculate 
abs(DH-YTD) for all YTD={1,2,3,4,5}, and use the default probability and recovery rate 
of YTD whose abs(DH-YTD) is the smallest. 
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[Appendix B] Variable Derivation 
 
In this appendix we provide the details of how each variable used in the regression models is 
calculated or sourced. In the first section we outline each of the ten components of the CEO’s 
inside debt measure and in the second section we provide definitions for our control variables.  
 
1. Calculation of CEOs’ inside debt measure 
 
[1]Dividend yield. Execucomp uses dividend yield estimates over a rolling 3 year window in B-
S calculations. As such, the estimated dividend yield is the company's average dividend yield 
over the past 3 years leading up to the beginning of the fiscal periods. Execucomp winsorizes the 
dividend yield at the 5th and 95th percentiles, which is a procedure we follow as well. 
 
[2]Volatility. Execucomp uses volatility estimates over a rolling 5 year window in B-S 
calculations. As such, the estimated volatility is the annualized standard deviation of stock 
returns estimated over the 60 months leading up to the beginning of the fiscal periods. 
Execucomp winsorizes volatility values at the 5th and 95th percentiles, which is a procedure we 
also follow. For firms with less than 12 months of data for that year, the average volatility of 
S&P1500 firms is used instead.  
 
[3]Risk-free rate. We download the annual Treasury rates for 2006-2012 from the Federal 
Reserve website (file fed_website_10yrTnote in Excel). We use the risk-free rate that 
corresponds to actual maturity. While Execucomp assumes a 70% haircut on time to maturity and 
uses a 7 year maturity for newly granted options, and therefore uses the 7 year risk-free rate for 
grant date valuation, we use the actual rounded maturity (expiration date minus fiscal year end 
date). Note that since the FED website gives only 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year rates, we interpolate 
the numbers for years 4, 6, 8, and 9.  
 
[4]CEO stock option valuation.  
Executives’ equity holdings include both stock ownership and the stock options. We apply the 
Black-Scholes (1973) option model to value each individual tranche of options held by the 
executives (e.g., exercisable and un-exercisable) and sum the tranche values to a grand total. We 
calculate B-S value of options granted using Execucomp methodology following Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen (2013), considering that “OA” methodology used in Cassell et al. (2012) is not 
consistent with the FAS 123R issued by the FASB in 2004 and SEC amendments in 2006. To 
value stock options, we use the Black-Scholes (1973) model modified by Merton (1973) to 
account for dividend payouts.  
 
𝑉𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑆𝑒
−𝑑𝑇𝑁(𝑍) − 𝑋𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑍 − 𝜎√𝑇) 
where: 
 
𝑍 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆
𝑋) + 𝑇 (𝑟 − 𝑑 +
𝜎2
2 )
𝜎√𝑇
 
N: the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution; 
S: the price of the underlying stock; 
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X: the exercise price of the option; 
σ: the expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r: the natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate; 
T: the time-to-maturity of the option in years; 
d: the natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option. 
 
Cassell et al. (2012) estimate newly granted options using the grant-specific information 
disclosed in annual proxy statement. To value previously granted options, they follow Core and 
Guay’s (2002) ‘‘one year approximation’’ (OA) process.  
 
We compute incentives as of fiscal year-end following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2013), using 
only the unexercised unexercisable options and unexercised exercisable options. This is because: 
1) FAS 123R issued by the FASB in 2004 and SEC amendments in 2006, and 2) our sample 
focuses on observations after 2007 and those in 2006 under the new reporting format. 
 
Execucomp provides a separate record for each outstanding option tranche (denoted by a 
different value of OUTAWDNUM), indicating the number of vested, unvested, and unearned 
options (OPTS_UNEX_EXER, OPTS_UNEX_UNEXER, OPTS_UNEX_UNEARN) of each 
tranche, and their corresponding exercise price (EXPRIC) and expiration date (EXDATE). 
 
To calculate the option values of executives’ compensation, we require the following: 
Inputs Variables in Compustat 
Stock price prcc_f 
Expected stock-return volatility estimated_sigma 
Expected dividend yield estimated_yield 
Exercise price Expric 
Time-to-maturity maturity=(exdate-datadate)/365 
Risk-free rate RF 
# of unexercised exercisable options OPTS_UNEX_EXER 
# of unexercised unexercisable options OPTS_UNEX_UNEXER 
 
For a small percentage of observations, maturity is indicated to be smaller than -1. This is 
obviously unusual so we check the “Outstanding Equity Awards” in prior years' DEF 14A and 
compare it with other executives' stock option grants and find that this occurs most likely due to 
recoding error. For these cases, we add 10 years to the expiration date to arrive at a reasonable 
maturity.  
 
When there are multiple grants for the same executive in the same year, data on the maturity of 
one option award is sometimes missing or negative even though other awards in that year have 
data on maturity. In these cases, we replace the maturity and exercise price that is missing or 
negative with the average maturity of the other awards granted to the same executive in the same 
year. For rounded maturity that is less than 1 or greater than 10 years, we use 1year and 10 year 
annual treasury rates to proxy the risk-free rates respectively. 
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Detailed information on option tranches is included in the “Outstanding Awards Table” in 
Compustat Execucomp. We find that there are cases when sums of the tranche numbers of 
options (unvested and vested) don’t equal to the total option grants in “Execucomp Anncomp 
Table”. We check these cases manually, and use the actual data in the “Outstanding Awards 
Table” of DEF 14A for those cases whose information on tranche information in Execucomp is 
incorrect (incomplete tranches or wrong number of individual tranche). 
 
After obtaining the value of each option, we sum the tranche values to arrive at a grand total. 
Denoting the value of an unexercised unexercisable option and an unexercised exercisable option 
as Value_unex and Value_ex, we have: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸 =∑(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑆_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅𝑘 + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑒𝑥𝑘
∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑆_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋_𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅𝑘) 
 
For more on stock option valuation, please see Coles, J., Daniel, N., Naveen, L., 2013; Coles, J., 
Naveen, N., Naveen, L., 2006; Daniel, N., Li, Y., and Naveen, L. 2013; 
 
[5]CEO stock ownership. We calculate the value of stocks held by the executives by 
multiplying the number of shares held (including restricted shares) by the stock price at the 
firm’s fiscal year-end. SHROWN_TOT (SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) is the shares owned by the 
executive, including (excluding) options that are exercisable or will become exercisable within 
60 days. Following previous research (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2013), we deduct options that 
become exercisable within 60 days after the proxy statement to avoid double counting the 
options in the outstanding equity table. Therefore, we have: 
𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐸 = 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁_𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐿_𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑆 
 
The data items required are:  
Inputs Variables 
Stock price prcc_f 
Number of shares held SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS 
 
 
[6]CEO Equity holdings.  
𝑉𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐸 = 𝑉𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸 + 𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐸  
 
[7]CEO inside debt holdings. The sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits 
(PENSION_VALUE_TOT) and deferred compensation (DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) as reported 
in Execucomp.  
𝑉𝐸𝐷 = 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂𝑇 + 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸_𝑇𝑂𝑇 
 
[8]Firm equity. The market value of equity is calculated as the price of the share at the end of 
the fiscal year prcc_f (Price Close - Annual - Fiscal) times the number of outstanding shares 
CSHO (Common Shares Outstanding) at the end of the fiscal year.  
 
𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂 
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[9]Firm delta. Similar to CEO delta, we adopt the definition of delta in Core and Guay (2002). 
For firm delta, three required inputs to the Black-Scholes formula are stock price, expected 
stock-return volatility, expected dividend yield. These are the same items used in the calculation 
of CEO delta. Other inputs are listed in the following table: 
 
 
Inputs Variables in Compustat 
Exercise price OPTPRCEY 
Time-to-maturity 4  
Risk free rate 4 year Treasury bill rates 
Options outstanding OPTOSEY 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐹 = ∆𝑉𝐹𝐸 = 𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹 ∗ 0.01 + 𝑒
−4∗𝑑 ∗ 𝑁(𝑍) ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑌 ∗ 0.01 
 
[10]Firm debt. Total firm debt includes current debt DLC (Debt in Current Liabilities – Total) 
and long-term debt DLTT (Long-Term Debt – Total).  
 
𝑉𝐹𝐷 = 𝐷𝐿𝐶 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇 
 
2. Control variables  
 
Definitions and descriptions of controls are listed in the following table:  
Controls Descriptions 
CEO vega/delta ratio Vega_Delta=(VegaE/DeltaE)*(VequityE/VdebtE) 
Log of total current comp(salary+bonus) LogCurr= ln(Total_Curr) 
Log of firm age logfirm_age=ln(firm_age) 
Log of total assets logAT=ln(AT) 
Market-to-book ratio M2B= CSHO*prcc_f/CEQ, where CEQ is the total  
Common/Ordinary Equity. 
Sales growth Psale=REVT(Revenue – Total) in year t/ REVT in year t-1 
Annual return ARET=(prcc_f at fiscal year t-prcc_f at fiscal year t-1)/prcc_f at 
fiscal year t-1 
Debt/equity ratio D2E=(DLC+DLTT)/(CSHO*prcc_f) 
Cash surplus CS2AT= (net cash flow from operations (OANCF)-Depreciation 
expenses (DPC)+Research and development 
expenditures(XRD))/Total assets(AT); We set XRD to zero if XRD 
is missing. 
Industry fixed effect 1 or 0 
Year fixed effect 1 or 0 
 
Since there is no direct variable indicating firms’ age in CRSP and Compustat we 
estimate firm age by identify the first fiscal year that the firm appeared in Compustat and use the 
beginning date of that fiscal year to mark the “birth” of the firm. Firm age is the difference 
between firm birth and the current fiscal year end.  
In the above table, we calculate CEO delta and vega following Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2013). In calculating option delta and vega, we use only unexercised unexercisable options and 
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unexercised exercisable options. We do not use unearned awards (e.g., unvested awards for 
which future vesting is contingent or accelerated based on achieving stock price or accounting 
hurdles) because the data required to calculate incentives for these awards are not available in 
electronic format in Execucomp for any firm. Ignoring the unearned awards has the effect of 
underestimating true delta and vega. These unearned shares or options will be classified as either 
shares or options when they are earned, and, if these grants are still held by the executive as of 
the end of the year, they will be included in the delta and vega calculations at that time.  
 
Delta 
To compute overall equity delta, we add the delta of the portfolio of options and the delta of the 
portfolio of shares. Execucomp provides the number of restricted stocks outstanding at the end of 
each year (SHRS_UNVEST_NUM), but not data on unrestricted stock holding. Therefore we use 
the variable SHROWN_EXCL_OPTIONS, which is the sum of both restricted and unrestricted 
shares. That is,  
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸 = ∆𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸 = ∆𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁_𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐿_𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹 ∗ 0.01 +∑(𝑁𝑖 ∗ ∆𝑁𝑖) 
where: 
𝑁𝑖 is the number of options in tranche i and ∆𝑁𝑖is the option delta for tranche i, defined as the 
following: 
Variables Variables in Compustat Description 
Ni OPTS_UNEX_UNEXER Amount of securities underlying Unexercised 
unexercisable options 
OPTS_UNEX_EXER Amount of securities underlying Unexercised 
exercisable options 
 
And ∆𝑁𝑖 is the option delta for tranche i. According to Core and Guay (2002), the sensitivity with 
respect to one percent change in stock price is  
𝜕(𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
𝜕(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
∗
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
100
= 𝑒−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑍) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 100⁄  
 
Namely, ∆𝑁𝑖 = 𝑒
−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑍) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 100⁄  
 
Vega 
For vega of the equity portfolio, we use only the vega of the option portfolio calculated above. 
We assume, as in Guay (1999), that vega of the share portfolio is zero. That is 
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝐸 =∑(𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝜃𝑖) 
And i is the option vega for tranche i. According to Core and Guay (2002), the sensitivity with 
respect to one percent change in stock return volatility is  
𝜕(𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
𝜕(𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
∗
1
100
= 𝑒−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑍) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑇1 2⁄ ∗ 0.01 
Namely, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝑒
−𝑑𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑍) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑇1 2⁄ ∗ 0.01 
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[Appendix C] Ridge Regression 
 
The standard OLS estimator of the regression coefficients is:  
 
𝛾 = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑌 
 
Where X is the independent variables, Y is the dependent variable, and 𝛾 is the estimated 
coefficients using OLS. The OLS fits a linear model with coefficients to minimize the residual 
sum of squares (SSR) between the observed Y and the predicted ?̂? by the linear approximation. 
That is, 𝛾 solves the following optimization problem: 
 
Min 𝑆𝑆𝑅 = ‖𝑋𝛾 − 𝑌‖2 
 
It is commonly known that 𝛾 is the best linear unbiased estimate (BLUE) for γ. However, 
the coefficient estimates for OLS rely on the independence of the explanatory variables. When 
multicollinearity occurs, X becomes close to singular and the OLS estimates become highly 
sensitive to random errors, resulting in a large variance.  
 
Var(𝛾) = 𝜎2(𝑋′𝑋)−1 
 
First developed by Hoerl and Kennard (1970a, b), and tested and extended by others (e.g., 
Lowerre, 1974; Farebrother, 1975; Vinod, 1978; Kutner et al., 2004), ridge regression, as a 
multivariate technique, modifies the OLS estimation in order to minimize the variance in γ by 
incorporating a small amount of bias into the estimating equation. 
Through imposing a penalty on the size of coefficients, the ridge regression aims to 
minimize the sum of SSR and the variance of γ. As an optimization problem, the ridge estimates 
minimize the following cost function, a penalized residual sum of squares:  
 
Min 𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒) = ‖𝑋𝛾 − 𝑌‖2 + 𝜆‖𝛾‖2 
 
The ridge estimating equation is: 
𝛾* = (X’X+λI)-1 X’Y 
Where the positive constant λ (0<λ<1) is the added bias, called the ridge parameter, and I is 
the identity matrix. 
 
In other words, the ridge regression reduces a large portion of variance of γ  without 
increasing the penalized residual sum of squares 𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒) to an unreasonable value through 
introducing an added constant 𝜆. The ridge regression solution is identical to the OLS solution 
except for the term λI and is linear in the response variable y. For a given bias λ, the ridge 
solution contains the minimum SSRγ and decreases the variance in γ. Because the mean square 
error is a function of both bias and variance in γ, a small bias is acceptable if the ridge estimation 
reduces a larger portion of the variance in γ. Kutner et al. (2004) show that biased estimators with 
a small variance are preferable to unbiased estimators with a large variance, because the small 
variance estimators are less sensitive to the measurement errors.  
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Hoerl and Kennard (1970) suggest the selection of the ridge parameter should: (1) stabilize 
the system such that it reflects an orthogonal (i.e., statistically independent) system. In practice, 
we think that a model is out of multicollinearity when VIF is smaller than 10; (2) lead to 
coefficients with reasonable values and ensure that coefficients with improper signs at k=0 have 
switched to the proper sign; (3) ensure that the residual sum of squares is not inflated to an 
unreasonable value. 
Following the procedure in Hoerl and Kennard (1970), Vinod (1978), and Marquette and 
Johnson (1980), we conduct the ridge regression analysis of log of total risk t+1 as below: 
 
(1) Plot the ridge estimate 𝛾* for each variable against a range of values for the ridge 
parameter λ, termed “ridge traces”. These graphs show how each variable reacts to the 
elimination of the non-orthogonality.  
Denoting the “ridge traces” as 𝛾*(λ) and incrementing λ from 0 to 0.02 by 0.002, we get the 
ridge estimates of 𝛾* for different λ’s. In Table C1 and Figure C1, we can see that the minimal k 
to reduce multicollinearity problem is 0.006, where VIF value is below 10, the rule of thumb 
value, suggesting no multicollinearity.  
Table C1. VIF traces 
λ 
VIF of Log of CEO to firm 
debt/Equity ratio 
VIF of Log of Adjusted CEO to 
firm debt/Equity ratio 
0 801.1770 804.4366 
0.002 45.6213 45.8031 
0.004 14.9834 15.0394 
0.006 7.5221 7.5473 
0.008 4.6129 4.6261 
0.01 3.1841 3.1913 
0.012 2.3775 2.3815 
0.014 1.8777 1.8796 
0.016 1.5463 1.5468 
0.018 1.3151 1.3147 
0.02 1.1471 1.1460 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
Figure C1: VIF versus Ridge Parameters 
 
 
(2) Locate a value of λ such that the γ ̂* coefficient is economically reasonable and will yield 
an equation whose residual sum of squares is not inflated to an unreasonable value.  
Table C2 and Figure C2 suggest that to ensure that the coefficients with reasonable sign, the 
ridge parameter should be no less than 0.008.  
Table C2. Standardized coefficients  
λ 
Coefficients of Log of CEO to 
firm debt/Equity ratio 
Coefficients of Log of Adjusted 
CEO to firm debt/Equity ratio 
0 0.4983  -0.5904  
0.002 0.0845  -0.1758  
0.004 0.0285  -0.1198  
0.006 0.0063  -0.0976  
0.008 -0.0057  -0.0857  
0.01 -0.0132  -0.0783  
0.012 -0.0183  -0.0733  
0.014 -0.0221  -0.0697  
0.016 -0.0250  -0.0669  
0.018 -0.0272  -0.0647  
0.02 -0.0290  -0.0630  
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.02
V
IF
ridge parameter
VIF traces(Log of total risk t+1 )
Log of CEO to firm debt/Equity ratio
Log of Adjusted CEO to firm debt/Equity ratio
 
64 
 
 
Figure C2: Standardized coefficients versus Ridge Parameter 
 
(3) In ridge regression, the bias is an increasing function of the ridge parameter, and the ridge 
estimates are exactly the OLS estimates when the ridge parameter λ=0. In other words, the OLS 
yields the minimum SSR, and SSR increases as λ increases. Therefore, to ensure the least 
SSR(regression sum of squares), we list the SSR’s in Table C3 and show that the SSR’s are only 
inflated slightly for all of our regressions. For example, for a ridge parameter 0.008, the SSR 
increases by merely 0.1% on average.  
Table C3. SSR inflation 
λ 
SSR 
(Log of total 
risk t+1) 
SSR 
(Log of total 
risk t+3) 
SSR 
(Log of 
idiosyncratic 
risk t+1) 
SSR 
(Log of 
idiosyncratic 
risk t+3) 
0.000 752.238 1005.165 942.722 1304.270 
0.002 752.705 1005.277 943.679 1304.351 
0.004 752.877 1005.355 944.020 1304.433 
0.006 752.981 1005.449 944.227 1304.543 
0.008 753.067 1005.567 944.401 1304.687 
0.010 753.151 1005.712 944.571 1304.863 
0.012 753.236 1005.882 944.749 1305.073 
0.014 753.327 1006.077 944.939 1305.313 
0.016 753.425 1006.296 945.142 1305.583 
0.018 753.531 1006.538 945.361 1305.881 
0.020 753.644 1006.802 945.595 1306.207 
 
Combining the above results, we set the ridge parameter λ=0.008. Repeating the above 
procedures, we get the ridge parameters for all of our dependent variables as in Table C4. 
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Table C4: Ridge Parameters for all four regressions. 
 Dependent variables λ 
Log of total risk t+1 0.008 
Log of total risk t+3 0.01 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+1 0.01 
Log of idiosyncratic risk t+3 0.014 
 
 
 
 
 
